Tan v. Fabre
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the alleged illegal detention and subsequent deportation of Cheng San, also known as Francisco Tan or Tan Ko, a Chinese national residing in the Philippines. The petitioner, Donata Oliveros de Tan, acting on behalf of her husband Cheng San, contended that the deportation order was based on an inapplicable provision of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Procedural History: The Commissioners of Immigration, after an investigation, issued an order on September 3, 1948, for the deportation of Cheng San. Prior to the filing of the petition for certiorari and habeas corpus on September 7, 1948, Cheng San had already been deported to China on September 8, 1948. The petitioner argued that the Commissioners lacked jurisdiction to detain and order the deportation of an alien already residing in the Philippines under the cited section of the Immigration Act. The Petition: This case comes before the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari and habeas corpus. The petitioner sought to challenge the deportation order, arguing that the Commissioners of Immigration exceeded their jurisdiction by ordering the deportation of Cheng San under a provision of the Immigration Act that was not applicable to aliens already residing within the Philippines. The petition was filed after the subject of the deportation had already been removed from the jurisdiction of the Philippines.
Issue(s)
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to grant a petition for habeas corpus when the person sought to be released has already been deported from the Philippines before the filing of the petition. Whether the Commissioners of Immigration had jurisdiction to order the deportation of Cheng San alias Francisco Tan under Section 37(a), paragraph 8 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
Ruling
The petition is denied with costs against the petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition: The Court held that since the person in whose favor the petition for habeas corpus was filed had already been deported to a place outside the Philippines before the filing of the petition, he was beyond the jurisdiction and control of the respondents. Consequently, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction or power to compel the respondents to produce the body of the said person and order his release. The Court distinguished this case from Villavicencio vs. Lucban, where the persons in whose behalf the petition was filed were within the Philippines and the respondent had the power to obey the court's order. In the present case, the subject of the deportation was already outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and the respondents' control at the time the petition was filed, rendering the habeas corpus remedy moot and academic. On the issue of the Commissioners' jurisdiction to order deportation: The Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the respondents to order the deportation of an undesirable alien from the Philippines under Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The Court cited its previous decision in Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre (81 Phil., 682), which squarely applied to the present case, upholding the validity of such deportation orders issued by the Commissioners of Immigration.
Main Doctrine
A petition for habeas corpus seeking the release of a person who has already been deported from the Philippines before the filing of the petition, and is thus beyond the jurisdiction and control of the respondents, must be denied for lack of jurisdiction.