Desbarats v. Vera
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiffs-appellants Mary Burke Desbarats and Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr. (executor of the estate of W. J. Burke) filed an ejectment case against defendant-appellant Tomas de Vera for the premises known as the "Burke Building." The municipal court rendered judgment ordering the defendant to vacate, restore possession, and pay P110,000 for back rentals plus P19,000 monthly. The Court of First Instance (CFI) modified this, ordering the defendant to surrender possession and pay rentals from June 1, 1947, at P10,400 monthly, less amounts collected from sub-leases. Procedural History: Both parties appealed. The defendant, on July 30, 1948, wrote to plaintiff Carrascoso stating he was formally delivering the Burke Building as of July 31, 1948, but retaining a small portion for his office and "Counterkool." Plaintiff Carrascoso responded on July 31, 1948, accepting the takeover but requesting the defendant to immediately vacate the retained portion. The CFI, on September 24, 1948, issued an order allowing the defendant to retain a portion of the building at P2,000 monthly, despite the records on appeal having been approved on September 23, 1948. The Petition: The Supreme Court was called upon to resolve the plaintiffs' motion for immediate execution of the CFI judgment ordering the defendant to vacate the building entirely. The plaintiffs argued that the defendant's partial delivery of the premises constituted a waiver of his right to appeal regarding possession, and that the CFI's subsequent order allowing retention was void.
Issue(s)
Whether the defendant's partial delivery of the premises constitutes a waiver of his right to appeal the judgment ordering him to vacate. Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to issue an order allowing the defendant to retain a portion of the building after the records on appeal had been approved.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for immediate execution of the appealed judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 12, 1948, in so far only as it orders the defendant to surrender to the plaintiffs the possession of the "Burke Building" in its entirety.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of waiver of appeal due to partial execution: The Court held that the defendant's act of delivering the greater portion of the property was done "in accordance with the decision of the Court of First Instance," thereby plainly acquiescing in said decision at least in so far as it orders him to surrender possession. The judgment for possession is indivisible, and the delivery of the greater portion estops the defendant from assailing the propriety of the appealed judgment regarding possession. The Court cited Verches vs. Rios and De Egana's Succession for the principle that a party who voluntarily executes a judgment, partially or in toto, is not permitted to appeal from it, as this constitutes an estoppel. On the validity of the CFI's order allowing retention: The Court declared the order issued by the CFI on September 24, 1948, allowing the defendant to retain a portion of the building, as "conspicuously null and void." This is because the order was issued after the records on appeal had been approved, at which point the CFI had lost jurisdiction over the case. The Court clarified that such an order cannot be considered merely for the protection and preservation of rights, as it directly involved a litigated matter. The Court further stated that a void order may be attacked collaterally, and that the plaintiffs' motion for immediate execution was a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, avoiding multiplicity of suits.
Main Doctrine
A party who voluntarily executes, either partially or in toto, the execution of a judgment is not permitted to appeal from it, as the act of executing the judgment constitutes an estoppel. However, an order issued after the loss of jurisdiction is void and may be attacked collaterally.