University of Santo Tomas v. Ocampo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner, University of Santo Tomas (UST), obtained a judgment against respondents Dionisio Pabiloña and Yu Tuy (alias Yu Bontoy) in the Municipal Court of Manila for unlawful detainer. The judgment ordered the respondents to vacate the U.S.T. Restaurant building and pay accrued rents and damages totaling P8,705.84. Procedural History: The respondents received the municipal court's decision on September 7, 1948. They filed a notice of appeal, an appeal bond of P30, and a supersedeas bond of P11,200 on September 16, 1948, to stay execution. The municipal court approved the supersedeas bond. The case was docketed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) on September 25, 1948. The Petition: On October 13, 1948, UST moved for the immediate execution of the municipal court's judgment, alleging that the respondents failed to pay the rent for September 1948 on or before October 10, 1948. The respondent judge denied the motion, ruling that the September rent was covered by the P11,200 supersedeas bond. Respondents have been depositing subsequent rents with the CFI clerk. This petition for mandamus seeks to compel the CFI judge to issue a writ of execution.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge erred in holding that the rent for September 1948 was covered by the supersedeas bond. Whether rents accruing after the perfection of the appeal in an unlawful detainer case must be deposited in court despite the supersedeas bond.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The respondent judge did not err in holding that the rent for September 1948 was covered by the supersedeas bond, and thus acted within the purview of Section 8 of Rule 72.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the respondent judge erred in holding that the rent for September 1948 was covered by the supersedeas bond: The Court held that the respondent judge acted within the purview of Section 8 of Rule 72 in denying the motion for execution. The appeal and supersedeas bond were approved on September 16, 1948, and the case was docketed in the CFI on September 25, 1948. Since a significant portion of the rent for September had already accrued before the appeal was perfected and docketed, and this rent was included in the supersedeas bond which was approved by the municipal court, the defendant-appellant was not required to make a separate deposit for that month's rent. The Court reiterated the principle that rents accruing after the perfection and during the pendency of the appeal must be deposited, but the supersedeas bond covers rents, damages, and costs up to the time of final judgment. In this specific instance, the inclusion and approval of the September rent within the supersedeas bond satisfied the requirement for that period. On the issue of whether rents accruing after the perfection of the appeal must be deposited in court despite the supersedeas bond: The Court affirmed the well-settled doctrine that rents accruing after the perfection and during the pendency of the appeal must be deposited in court. However, this obligation is distinct from the coverage of the supersedeas bond, which answers for rents, damages, and costs down to the time of final judgment. The crucial point in this case was the specific inclusion and approval of the September rent within the supersedeas bond. The Court clarified, citing Aylon vs. Jugo, that only rentals accruing after the perfection of the appeal need to be paid or deposited, provided that prior accrued rentals are covered by the supersedeas bond. In this case, the September rent, having largely accrued before perfection, was covered by the bond, thus absolving the appellant from a separate deposit for that month.
Main Doctrine
In unlawful detainer cases, rents accruing after the perfection and during the pendency of the appeal must be deposited in court, notwithstanding the supersedeas bond which answers for rents, damages, and costs down to the time of final judgment. However, if the supersedeas bond, as approved by the municipal court, includes the rent for the month in which the appeal was perfected, and the appeal is docketed in the Court of First Instance thereafter, the defendant-appellant is not required to deposit that specific month's rent again.