Belviz v. Buenaventura
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the partition of an estate. An order was initially entered on April 8, 1941, approving a counter-project of partition submitted by counsel for the heirs. This order stipulated that the partition was subject to the outcome of contested land cases pending before the court. 2. Procedural History: Following the April 8, 1941 order, a motion for reconsideration was filed on April 14, 1941, and denied on May 3, 1941. Subsequently, a second motion for reconsideration was filed on May 26, 1941. The respondent Judge granted this second motion on July 21, 1941, setting aside the previous order approving the counter-project of partition and deferring the distribution of properties until the cadastral land cases were resolved. 3. The Petition: The petitioner contends that the respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction by issuing the July 21, 1941 order. The petitioner argues that the April 8, 1941 order had become final, as the second motion for reconsideration did not suspend the period for appeal. The Supreme Court, however, found that the second motion for reconsideration, having been granted, suspended the period for appeal, and thus dismissed the petition for certiorari.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of July 21, 1941. Whether the second motion for reconsideration suspended the period for appeal.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the respondent Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction: The Court held that the respondent Judge did not act in excess of jurisdiction. The petitioner's contention that the order of April 8, 1941, had become final was based on the premise that the second motion for reconsideration did not suspend the period for appeal. However, the Court found no evidence in the record to suggest that the second motion for reconsideration was a mere reiteration or contained grounds that could have been included in the first motion. Therefore, the presumption of regularity applied, and it was presumed that the second motion was based on an allowed ground. This presumption was further confirmed by the fact that the respondent Judge granted the motion. On the issue of whether the second motion for reconsideration suspended the period for appeal: The Court affirmed that while a 30-day period for appeal is generally not interrupted by a motion for reconsideration that merely reiterates a previous petition or contains grounds that existed and could have been included in the first motion, this restriction does not apply if the second motion is based on an allowed ground. In this case, the granting of the second motion by the respondent Judge indicated it was based on an allowed ground. Consequently, the second motion suspended the running of the period for appeal from its filing on May 26, 1941, until it was acted upon on July 21, 1941. The Court calculated that the second motion was filed within the 30-day period from April 8, 1941, after deducting the time the first motion was pending, leaving only 29 days elapsed before the second motion was filed.
Main Doctrine
A second motion for reconsideration, if granted, suspends the running of the period for appeal, provided it is filed within the reglementary period and based on an allowed ground, which is presumed when the motion is granted.