Viray v. Amnesty Commission
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Juan D. Crisologo, a regular Philippine Army Officer, was charged before a general court martial with murder for allegedly ordering the execution of eight persons, including Boy Viray, during the Japanese occupation. Crisologo was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Procedural History: At the beginning of his trial, Crisologo refused to avail himself of Amnesty Proclamation No. 8. After conviction, he filed an application for amnesty with the respondent Amnesty Commission. Benigno S. Viray, father of one of the victims, opposed the application, arguing Crisologo was not a guerilla, was estopped from invoking amnesty, and that the conviction was not yet final. The Petition: Viray filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Amnesty Commission from taking jurisdiction over Crisologo's application. The Amnesty Commission, in Resolution No. 29, held that it had jurisdiction. Viray sought prohibition from the Supreme Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Crisologo is precluded from invoking Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 after initially refusing its benefits. Whether Crisologo's plea of not guilty before the court martial is inconsistent with his subsequent application for amnesty. Whether the pendency of a review of the court martial decision by higher authorities bars the invocation of amnesty. Whether Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 is applicable to members of the regular armed forces (USAFFE) and not exclusively to guerilla forces.
Ruling
The petition for prohibition is denied. The respondent Amnesty Commission has jurisdiction to entertain, hear, and decide the petition filed before it by respondent Crisologo. There is no pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the refusal to invoke amnesty initially: The Court held that Crisologo is not precluded from invoking Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 after his conviction, even if he initially refused its benefits. The Court reasoned that before conviction, he might have believed his actions were justified and within his duties. However, after conviction, he realized the necessity of seeking amnesty. There is no legal impediment to his seeking the benefits of a law that, in his opinion, covers the act for which he was found criminally responsible. On the inconsistency of plea and amnesty application: The Court found no inconsistency between Crisologo's plea of not guilty before the court martial and his subsequent application for amnesty. A plea of not guilty does not necessarily deny the commission of the act but may imply that the accused claims no criminal responsibility. The Court noted that Crisologo did not deny ordering the execution but claimed the victims were aiding the enemy. This was consistent with the ruling in Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, which held that admitting the commission of the act is not a prerequisite for invoking amnesty. On the pendency of review: The Court ruled that amnesty may be invoked at any stage of criminal proceedings, including after conviction and pending appeal. The Court cited Administrative Order No. 11 and Department Order No. 20, which implement Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 and contemplate the consideration of cases not yet final, whether decided by civil courts or courts martial. Therefore, Crisologo was warranted in invoking amnesty despite his case still being under review. On the applicability to regular armed forces: The Court disagreed with the contention that Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 was intended only for guerilla forces. The Court reasoned that it would be too narrow a view to confine the benefits to a select group. The preamble and the denomination of commissions as "Guerilla" Amnesty Commissions were likely due to the majority of resistance members being in guerilla forces. However, the enacting clause of Proclamation No. 8 explicitly states amnesty is in favor of "all persons" who committed acts in furtherance of resistance. The Court emphasized that any reasonable doubt as to whether a case falls within the proclamation should be resolved in favor of the accused, and excluding members of the regular armed forces would be unfair.
Main Doctrine
Amnesty may be invoked at any stage of the criminal proceedings, and members of the regular armed forces are not necessarily excluded from its benefits, provided the acts committed were in furtherance of resistance to the enemy and not for purely personal motives.