People v. Margen
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Sometime before March 11, 1944, Diego Testor was asked by Sergeant Dario Margen, commander of a detachment of seven or eight soldiers, to fetch fish for the barracks. Testor traded some fish for camote for his children and then went to fetch the requested kalapion fish. Irritated by Testor's conduct, Sergeant Margen threw the fish into Testor's face, had his hands tied behind his back, and proceeded to maltreat him. Three soldiers, including appellant Andres Midoranda, joined in the maltreatment by hitting Testor. Sergeant Margen then forced Testor to eat raw kalapions, with Midoranda assisting in holding the rope binding Testor's hands. Testor was subsequently taken to Calbayog, where he died the following day, March 12, 1944, due to intestinal perforation caused by fish bones, despite medical attendance. Procedural History: Sergeant Dario Margen, Julian Tarrayo, and Andres Midoranda were prosecuted for murder. However, only Midoranda, the herein appellant, was tried as the other two escaped. The Court of First Instance of Samar convicted Midoranda of murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment, perpetual absolute disqualification, indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, and costs. The Appeal: Appellant Andres Midoranda appealed his conviction for murder. His primary argument was that he should not be held liable for murder, especially in the absence of proof of conspiracy, as he was merely obeying the orders of his superior, Sergeant Margen. He also claimed he did not participate in the maltreatment, only standing watch. The prosecution argued that the acts leading to Testor's death were performed while Testor was defenseless and that Midoranda actively participated in the unlawful acts.
Issue(s)
Whether appellant Andres Midoranda is criminally liable for the murder of Diego Testor despite claiming he was merely obeying the orders of his superior. Whether appellant's participation in the maltreatment and the act of forcing the deceased to eat raw fish constitutes murder.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance, holding appellant Andres Midoranda as a coprincipal in the crime of murder. The sentence of life imprisonment, perpetual absolute disqualification, and indemnity to the heirs was upheld, with costs against the appellant.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of obedience to a superior's order: The Court held that appellant Andres Midoranda is criminally liable for the murder of Diego Testor. The Court reiterated the principle enshrined in Article 11, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that obedience to an order of a superior is a justifying circumstance only when the order is for a lawful purpose. In this case, Sergeant Margen's order to torture the deceased was patently illegal and inhuman, and therefore, appellant was not bound to obey it. The Court found that appellant actively participated in the unlawful acts, including binding the deceased and participating in the maltreatment, and thus could not claim exemption from criminal liability. The Court also noted that the appellant and his companions may have had a common grievance against the deceased, suggesting a motive beyond mere obedience. On appellant's participation and the crime of murder: The Court found that the evidence clearly established appellant's participation in the unlawful acts that resulted in the death of Diego Testor. Appellant's own witness admitted that Midoranda slapped the deceased. Furthermore, the evidence showed that appellant cooperated with his co-defendants in binding the deceased and in the inhuman act of forcing him to eat raw fish. The Court concluded that these acts, performed while the deceased was defenseless, constituted murder. The Court found no circumstances that would either aggravate or mitigate appellant's criminal liability, and the penalty imposed by the lower court was in accordance with law. Therefore, the sentence appealed from was affirmed.
Main Doctrine
The case reaffirms the principle that the justifying circumstance of obedience to a lawful order (Article 11, par. 6 of the Revised Penal Code) is not applicable when the order given by a superior is unlawful or illegal. In such instances, the subordinate who carries out the illegal order cannot claim exemption from criminal liability and may be held as a principal to the crime committed. The Court stressed that subordinates have a duty to discern the legality of orders, particularly those involving the infliction of cruel or inhuman punishment.