Demaisip v. Makalintal
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute originated from Civil Case No. 768 in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, where the plaintiffs (now petitioners) sought, among other things, the delivery of 180 cavanes of palay or its value of P1,800 from the defendants. A preventive seizure of the defendants' property was ordered, resulting in the seizure of 92 cavanes of palay. Upon the defendants posting a counter-bond of P2,000, the release of the seized palay was ordered, but the sheriff failed to return it. 2. Procedural History: The trial court issued multiple orders directing the plaintiffs to return the seized palay to the defendants, which the plaintiffs consistently failed to comply with. Consequently, the defendants filed a motion requesting the Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation to pay the amount of its bond. Evidence presented indicated the seized palay was valued at P1,610. The defendants subsequently filed a supplementary motion seeking the dismissal of the case due to the plaintiffs' persistent non-compliance with court orders. On September 4, 1948, the court granted the dismissal, ordered the plaintiffs to pay P1,610 plus legal interest, and directed the surety company to pay P1,000, the amount of the bond, towards the damages. 3. The Petition: The petitioners, Gaudencio D. Demaisip and Modesta P. Demaisip, are challenging three orders issued by the respondent judge: the order of dismissal dated September 4, 1948, an order for immediate execution dated October 18, 1948, and an order denying their motion to suspend execution pending appeal dated December 15, 1948. They filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that these orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and are therefore null and void. The petitioners claim to have appealed the September 4, 1948 order, but the Supreme Court's records indicate no such appeal has been received, suggesting a potential abandonment of the appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders of September 4, 1948, October 18, 1948, and December 15, 1948. Whether a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when an appeal has been filed but allegedly abandoned.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari and prohibition is denied. The petitioners are ordered to pay the costs. The Supreme Court held that the order of dismissal dated September 4, 1948, has become final and executory due to the abandonment of the appeal. The petitioners' motion to post a bond to suspend execution was correctly denied, and the order for execution was valid. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' claim of grave abuse of discretion was unfounded. The trial court's orders were issued in response to the petitioners' persistent failure to comply with repeated court directives to return the attached palay. The dismissal of the case and the subsequent orders for execution were measures taken to enforce compliance and satisfy the judgment. The Court emphasized that if the trial court erred in its orders, the proper recourse was an appeal, not a petition for certiorari. Since the appeal was abandoned, the orders became final and executory. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 is only available when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioners claimed to have appealed the order of dismissal. However, the records showed that the appeal was not perfected or was abandoned, as no expediente had been received by the Supreme Court for over a year. In such a scenario, where an appeal is available but abandoned, certiorari is not the proper remedy. The Court noted that the petitioners' attempt to suspend execution by posting a bond was also correctly denied by the trial court, as the order of dismissal had become final and executory.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed that a writ of certiorari is only available when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. If an appeal has been filed but subsequently abandoned, the order becomes final and executory, and the remedy of certiorari is no longer appropriate to question the alleged errors of the lower court. The proper recourse for alleged errors of judgment is an appeal, not a petition for certiorari.