Hernandez v. Peña
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Ines Oliveros, as defendant in an unlawful detainer case, failed to deposit the rent of P200 for October 1948, as required by the municipal court's judgment. Petitioners filed a motion for writ of execution. Procedural History: The respondent judge, Emilio Peña, issued an order on December 21, 1948, directing the defendant to deposit rents for October and November 1948 within five days, otherwise a writ of execution would issue. This order was issued despite the defendant having filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. L-2602) seeking to be relieved of the monthly deposit obligation. The Petition: Petitioners Fernando and Felicidad Hernandez filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the respondent judge's order dated December 21, 1948, arguing it was contrary to Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court and existing jurisprudence.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated December 21, 1948, granting an extension for the deposit of rents in an unlawful detainer case pending appeal. Whether the filing of a petition for certiorari and prohibition automatically suspends the obligation to deposit rents.
Ruling
The Supreme Court set aside the order of the respondent judge dated December 21, 1948, and directed him to issue the writ of execution prayed for by the petitioners, with costs against respondent Ines Oliveros.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the respondent judge's authority to grant extensions for rent deposits: The Court held that Section 8 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court mandates the issuance of a writ of execution upon motion of the plaintiff and proof of the defendant's failure to make the required payment or deposit during the pendency of an appeal in an unlawful detainer case. The Court emphasized that the word "shall" in the rule indicates a mandatory duty. Furthermore, the Court reiterated its consistent ruling in various cases, including Lapus vs. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Arcega vs. Dizon, and Meneses vs. Dinglasan, that Courts of First Instance possess no jurisdiction to grant extensions of time for such payments. The order of the respondent judge, which effectively granted an extension, was therefore contrary to law and established jurisprudence. On the effect of filing a petition for certiorari and prohibition: The Court clarified that the mere filing by the respondent Ines Oliveros of a petition for certiorari and prohibition, wherein she prayed to be relieved of the obligation of making the monthly deposit, did not ipso facto relieve her of such obligation. The Court noted that the respondent judge himself implicitly recognized this by requiring her to make the deposit within five days, indicating that the obligation remained despite the pending petition. Therefore, her failure to deposit the rent for October 1948, and subsequently for November 1948 as ordered, constituted a default that warranted the execution of the judgment.
Main Doctrine
A Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to grant extensions of time for the deposit of rents pending appeal in an unlawful detainer case; failure to deposit within the period prescribed by law or the judgment shall, upon motion, result in the issuance of a writ of execution.