Goyena de Quizon v. Philippine National Bank
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff Angela Goyena de Quizon agreed to purchase properties from defendants Alex F. Magtibay and Paulina B. de la Cruz for P5,500. The agreement stipulated payment of P3,000 within 90 days and P2,500 within one year, without interest. Failure to comply with any stipulation would result in forfeiture of the right to purchase and obligation to vacate. Failure to pay the balance after paying the first installment would result in forfeiture of the amount paid. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Batangas rendered judgment approving the agreement. Plaintiff paid the P3,000 installment but failed to pay the P2,500 balance, citing the separation of the defendant spouses and uncertainty regarding who to pay. The court granted plaintiff an extension to deposit P2,500 with the clerk of court for the benefit of Paulina B. de la Cruz. Plaintiff failed to meet this deadline, leading to an order declaring her forfeiture of the P3,000 paid and loss of the right to repurchase, ordering her to vacate. The Petition: Plaintiff subsequently deposited P2,500 with the clerk of court. A writ of execution was issued, and the sheriff reported delivering possession of the property to Alejandro Magtibay, son of the defendants, after explaining the writ to the occupants of the ground floor. Defendants filed petitions to declare plaintiff in contempt for failing to vacate and deliver possession. The lower court found plaintiff in contempt and ordered her imprisonment until compliance.
Issue(s)
Whether a judgment for the delivery of real property is a 'special judgment' under Rule 39, Section 9, the disobedience of which constitutes contempt. Whether the plaintiff may be punished for contempt for failing to vacate the premises under Rule 64, Section 3(b).
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the lower court, acquitting the appellant of contempt of court. Costs were against the appellees.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the judgment in question is not a 'special judgment' enforceable under Section 9, Rule 39. A special judgment is one that requires the performance of an act other than the payment of money or the delivery of real or personal property. Since the judgment here specifically required the 'delivery of real property,' it falls strictly under the execution procedures of Section 8(d), Rule 39. In such instances, the writ of execution is directed to the sheriff to physically eject the losing party and place the winning party in possession. The court emphasized that the party against whom the judgment is rendered is not required to perform a positive act that would trigger contempt for non-performance. Therefore, the trial court erred in treating the order to vacate as a personal obligation of the plaintiff that could be enforced by imprisonment. On Issue 2: The Court ruled that Quizon cannot be punished for contempt under Rule 64, Section 3(b) because it is the sheriff's ministerial duty to carry out the dispossession. Relying on the precedent in United States v. Ramayrat, the Court explained that the defendant's unwillingness to deliver possession is 'officious and impertinent' and cannot hinder the sheriff from performing his duty, which may include the use of public force. The sheriff's return in this case was insufficient, as it did not clearly show that the plaintiff was actually required to leave and refused, or that she was physically dispossessed. Contempt under Rule 64, Section 3(h) only applies if a party re-enters the property after being legally ejected by an officer. Since there was no evidence of a valid dispossession followed by an unlawful re-entry, the contempt charge had no legal basis.
Main Doctrine
A party may not be held in contempt for failing to vacate premises if the sheriff did not personally eject them and deliver possession to the winning party as required by a writ of execution for the delivery of real property. Contempt proceedings for such failure must be based on disobedience to the judgment after proper execution, not on mere failure to vacate without a prior dispossession by the sheriff.