Hernandez v. Clapis
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiffs-appellees filed an action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, damages, etc., against the defendants-appellants in the Justice of the Peace Court of Tagum, Davao. The defendants lost in the Justice of the Peace Court, except as to damages. Procedural History: The defendants filed a notice of appeal through their counsel in Bacolod City. The clerk of the Court of First Instance sent a notice of the receipt of the record to the said attorneys, informing them that the period for filing a demurrer or answer would commence from the date of receipt. No answer or demurrer was filed within the prescribed period. On the scheduled hearing date, a motion to dismiss was filed, alleging that the right to possession should be determined by the government agency entrusted with land disposition, and that the plaintiff had no interest in the property, which was allegedly dummy land. The plaintiffs were furnished a copy of this motion only on the hearing date, prompting them to move for postponement. The court reset the hearing for the motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and for continuance on the merits. The trial was continued. On December 10, the court denied the motion to dismiss for want of merit. On the same date, the plaintiffs orally moved to adjudge the defendants in default for failure to answer within the period prescribed by the Rules of Court, and default judgment was entered. The Petition: The defendants appealed the order of the Court of First Instance denying their motion to set aside the order of default.
Issue(s)
Whether the notice of the receipt of the record on appeal sent to the attorneys of record in the Justice of the Peace Court was valid and binding upon the defendants-appellants. Whether the filing of a motion to dismiss, which was denied, suspended the period for filing an answer or demurrer. Whether the plaintiffs' opposition to the motion to dismiss constituted a waiver of their right to ask for a judgment by default.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the lower court denying the motion to set aside the order of default. Double costs were imposed against the attorneys for the defendants-appellants.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of the notice to counsel: The Court held that the notice of the receipt of the record on appeal sent to the attorneys in Bacolod City was proper and binding upon the defendants. The entry of appeal by these attorneys from the Justice of the Peace Court to the Court of First Instance was equivalent to their formal appearance in the higher court. This aligns with the spirit of Section 7 of Rule 40, forensic practice, and practical realities, as the attorneys continued to represent the defendants. The Court emphasized that service of notices on attorneys, rather than clients, is a general rule precisely because clients may not be familiar with court procedures, and their attorneys are the proper conduits for such information. The defendants' argument that notice should have been sent directly to them in Davao was deemed not well-taken. On the effect of the motion to dismiss: The Court ruled that the defendants' contention that the period for filing an answer commenced only after the denial of their motion to dismiss was without merit. The motion to dismiss was itself filed beyond the 15-day period prescribed for filing an answer or demurrer. A pleading filed out of time cannot suspend a statutory period that has already expired. Therefore, the defendants were already in default when they filed their motion to dismiss. On waiver of the right to default judgment: The Court rejected the theory that the plaintiffs' filing of an opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss constituted a waiver of their right to ask for a judgment by default. The Court cited the case of Mapua v. Mendoza, which held that while it is generally irregular to enter judgment by default while a motion remains pending, this rule does not apply when the pending motion is one to enter a judgment by default. In this case, the plaintiffs' motion for default was made after the denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss, and thus, there was no pending motion that would preclude the entry of default.
Main Doctrine
Notice of the receipt of the record on appeal sent to the attorneys of record in the Justice of the Peace Court is proper and binding upon the parties, even if the attorneys' law offices are in a different city, as their filing of the appeal constitutes their appearance in the Court of First Instance.