Rural Progress Administration v. De Guzman
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Rural Progress Administration (RPA) filed a complaint to expropriate two lots totaling 12,880 square meters in Dagupan City, intending to resell them to the occupants. The respondent, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lingayen, filed a pleading entitled "Motion of Dismissal" within the specified time, raising objections and defenses against RPA's right to expropriate. Procedural History: RPA contended that the Motion of Dismissal was defective for not containing a notice of hearing as required by Rule 26. RPA moved for the respondent judge to declare the defendant in default, which was denied by an order dated March 31, 1949. RPA also moved for an order of delivery of possession, having deposited the assessed value of the land. This motion was also denied by the respondent judge in his order of July 16, 1949. The Petition: RPA filed a petition for certiorari to annul the respondent judge's orders, alleging grave abuse of discretion.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion to declare the defendant in default. Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for an order of delivery of possession.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The respondent judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the petitioner's motions.
Ratio Decidendi
On the denial of the motion to declare the defendant in default: The Court held that the respondent judge acted in accordance with law. Rule 69, Section 4, governing eminent domain, provides that a defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present all objections and defenses in a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief within the time specified in the summons. This motion takes the place of an answer and puts in issue the plaintiff's right to expropriate. The rule requires only that a copy of the motion be served on the plaintiff's attorney of record and filed with the court with proof of service. It does not require the movant to set the motion for hearing, as it is the court that will set the case for trial at its convenience after the filing of the pleading. Therefore, the motion to dismiss filed by the respondent Bishop was a proper pleading under Rule 69, and its lack of a notice of hearing did not render it defective to the point of warranting a default order. On the denial of the motion for the delivery of the property: The Court found that the respondent judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for delivery of possession. This denial was based on two key factors: first, the right of the plaintiff to expropriate was being contested by the defendant; and second, the occupants of the land, for whose benefit the expropriation was sought, were already in possession of the land. The Court considered these circumstances, along with its previous decisions in Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration and City of Manila vs. Arellano Law College, in refraining from issuing the order of possession pending the resolution of the issue regarding the plaintiff's right to expropriate. Issuing an order of possession prematurely, especially when the very right to expropriate is in question and the property is already occupied by the intended beneficiaries, would be imprudent and potentially prejudicial.
Main Doctrine
A motion to dismiss in an expropriation case, filed in lieu of an answer, does not require a notice of hearing as prescribed by Rule 26, as it is a pleading that puts in issue the plaintiff's right to expropriate. The denial of a motion for delivery of possession is justified when the plaintiff's right to expropriate is contested and the occupants are already in possession.