Alvarado v. Director of Prisons
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Aniceto Alvarado y Como was convicted of theft by the Court of First Instance of Manila on June 21, 1947, and sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment of four months and one day to two years, four months, and one day. He remained in jail as a detention prisoner both before and during his trial and subsequent appeal. 2. Procedural History: The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence in a decision promulgated on March 29, 1948. The petitioner claims that he had already served a significant portion of his sentence, including preventive imprisonment, and was entitled to good conduct time allowance, which would have resulted in his release prior to the date the lower court ordered the commencement of his sentence. 3. The Petition: This case comes before the Supreme Court via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jesus Alvarado on behalf of his brother, Aniceto Alvarado y Como. The petition argues that Aniceto Alvarado has already served his maximum sentence, including good conduct time allowance, and is therefore unlawfully detained. The Solicitor General, representing the Director of Prisons, agrees with the petition.
Issue(s)
Whether the commencement date of the sentence, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, was correctly determined by the trial court. Whether the petitioner is entitled to immediate release from confinement.
Ruling
The petition for habeas corpus is granted. The respondent Director of Prisons is ordered to release the petitioner forthwith unless he is detained for some other lawful cause.
Ratio Decidendi
On the commencement date of the sentence: The Court held that the trial court erred in setting a date for the promulgation of the Court of Appeals' decision and commencing the period of imprisonment from that date. According to Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 53 in relation to Section 17 of Rule 120, a judgment is entered 15 days after promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the lower court for execution. The certified copy of the judgment is sent to the lower court not for promulgation or reading to the defendant, but for execution. It is presumed that the accused or their attorney had already been notified of the appellate decision. Therefore, it was unnecessary for the court of first instance to set the decision for reading or promulgation on a specific date, and it was an error to make the period of imprisonment commence on that date. Since the petitioner did not appeal the Court of Appeals' decision and was already in prison at the time of promulgation, he was deemed to have submitted himself for execution of the judgment as of the date of its promulgation. On the entitlement to release: The Court found that based on the correct computation, the petitioner's sentence, even without good conduct allowance, expired on June 30, 1950, and with good conduct allowance, it expired on March 30, 1950. In either case, the maximum period of his sentence of two years, four months, and one day had been served. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to discharge from custody.
Main Doctrine
The period of imprisonment for a judgment affirmed by the Court of Appeals commences from the date of promulgation of the appellate court's decision, not from a later date set for its reading in the lower court, especially when the accused was already under detention and did not appeal the appellate decision.