Sales v. Director of Prisons
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Fidel Ariston was convicted of frustrated murder and sentenced to imprisonment. He was granted a conditional pardon by the President after serving part of his sentence, with the condition that he not violate any penal laws. Subsequently, Ariston was convicted of estafa and sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Manila. Procedural History: Based on the conviction for estafa, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, ordered the Director of Prisons to recommit Fidel Ariston to serve the remaining unexpired portion of his original sentence for frustrated murder due to the violation of the condition of his pardon. The Petition: Floreña Sales, on behalf of Fidel Ariston, filed an original petition for habeas corpus, contending that the President has no authority to order the recommitment without Ariston being prosecuted and convicted for the offense of violating a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue(s)
Whether Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code was repealed by Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Whether the President's power to authorize the summary reincarceration of a violator of a conditional pardon is repugnant to the due process of law granted by the Constitution.
Ruling
The petition for habeas corpus is denied. Fidel Ariston is ordered to serve the remaining unexpired portion of his original sentence.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code was not repealed by Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. While Article 367 of the Revised Penal Code expressly repealed certain sections of the Administrative Code, it did not include Section 64(i). Furthermore, Section 9 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103), enacted after the Revised Penal Code, expressly preserves the authority conferred upon the President by Section 64(i). The legislative intent is clear that the President retains the power to authorize summary arrest and reincarceration. Article 159 and Section 64(i) are distinct: Article 159 creates a new offense (Evasion of Service of Sentence), whereas Section 64(i) provides an administrative remedy to enforce the original sentence. Consequently, the State may choose to proceed under either or both provisions without one precluding the other. On Issue 2: The Court ruled that summary recommitment does not violate the due process clause. Citing American jurisprudence, the Court reasoned that a convict is a felon at large by 'mere grace' and is not entitled to invoke organic safeguards like a citizen who has not been convicted. Since the convict was already constitutionally seized, tried, and sentenced for the original crime, the conditional pardon is a contract wherein the convict agrees the President may determine when a breach occurs. In the absence of a dispute regarding identity, the violator of a conditional pardon falls into the category of an escaped convict. As such, he is not entitled to a trial by jury or his day in court for the purpose of the summary reincarceration order, as the act of recommitment is merely the withdrawal of executive grace.
Main Doctrine
The President's authority under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code to order the arrest and reincarceration of a violator of a conditional pardon to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence is preserved and can stand independently of Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes such violation as a distinct offense. The proceeding under one provision does not preclude action under the other.