Gabor v. Director of Prisons
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Teodoro Gabor y Oro was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Leyte, for homicide and frustrated parricide. He was sentenced to serve prison correctional to prison mayor for homicide, with indemnity and subsidiary imprisonment, and eight years of prison mayor for frustrated parricide. Procedural History: Petitioner began serving his sentence on December 2, 1940. He was granted a reduction of one-fifth of his sentence for loyalty by the Superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony on June 4, 1942, purportedly under the authority of the Japanese Commander in Chief in Palawan. Petitioner claims he has fully served his principal penalties, with only subsidiary imprisonment for indemnity remaining, which he contends is null and void as the principal penalty for homicide exceeded prision correccional. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging illegal restraint due to the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment, which he argues is contrary to Article 39, Section 3 of the Revised Penal Code. He also asserts that his sentence has been fully served considering good conduct time allowances and other credits.
Issue(s)
Whether the reduction of the petitioner's sentence by the Superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony, authorized by the Japanese Commander in Chief, is valid. Whether the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for the homicide conviction is lawful.
Ruling
The petition for habeas corpus is denied. The reduction of sentence granted by the Superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony, under the purported authority of the Japanese Commander in Chief, is null and void. The Court found that the subsidiary imprisonment for the homicide conviction was not being served by the petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of the sentence reduction: The Court held that the reduction of the petitioner's sentence by the Superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony, purportedly authorized by the Japanese Commander in Chief in Palawan, is null and void. The authority granted by the Japanese Commander in Chief was not a repeal or modification of Articles 98, 99, and 158 of the Revised Penal Code, but rather a delegation of power to pardon or parole, as reduction of sentence is a partial pardon. The Court reiterated its rulings in Sameth vs. Director of Prisons, Caraos vs. Daza, and Botuyan vs. Director of Prisons that only the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese military forces and the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines were competent authorities to grant pardons during the Japanese occupation. Therefore, the Commander in Chief of the landing Japanese forces in Palawan had no power to authorize the pardon or reduction of the petitioner's sentence imposed by the civil courts. The respondent admitted that the subsidiary penalty was null and void and was not being served by the petitioner. On the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment: The respondent admitted that the subsidiary penalty imposed upon the petitioner in the homicide case is null and void, and for that reason, the petitioner has not been made to serve said penalty. Therefore, this issue, while raised by the petitioner, was rendered moot by the respondent's admission and the Court's finding that the petitioner was not being detained for this specific penalty.
Main Doctrine
A military occupant has no power to authorize the pardon or reduction of sentence imposed by civil courts of the occupied territory, as such action is an infringement upon the municipal laws of the land.