People v. Flemister
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On October 2, 1904, in Manila, John M. Flemister was charged with criminal attempt against an agent of the authorities. The charge alleged that Flemister unlawfully attached himself to Feliciano Celimin, a police officer, employed force against him, gravely intimidated him, and offered grave resistance while Celimin was discharging his duties. Specifically, Celimin was detailed to preserve peace at the San Lazaro Race Track. Flemister committed an assault and breach of the peace, and when Celimin attempted to arrest him, Flemister resisted, attacked, and struck Celimin, using vile and obscene language. This compelled the authorities to yield and refrain from arresting Flemister. An aggravating circumstance alleged was Flemister's prior punishment for two or more crimes with lighter penalties than the offense charged. Procedural History: The complaint was filed on October 5, 1904. Flemister pleaded not guilty and alleged autrefois acquit. The inferior court found that Flemister had been tried in the municipal court for violations of Ordinance No. 28 of the city of Manila. The municipal court complaints were: (1) making a disorder, disturbance, and breach of the peace, and assaulting Domingo Salvador; and (2) uttering slanderous, threatening, and abusive language to Captain Jose Crame. The municipal court dismissed the second complaint and found Flemister guilty of the first, sentencing him to a fine of 40 pesos. The Court of First Instance found Flemister guilty of criminal attempt against Feliciano Celimin under Article 249, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, with the aggravating circumstance of prior convictions, and sentenced him to four months and ten days of arresto mayor, a fine of 2,000 pesetas, and subsidiary imprisonment. The Petition: Flemister appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance to the Supreme Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the plea of autrefois acquit is valid when the offenses charged in the municipal court and the Court of First Instance, though arising from the same acts, are distinct. Whether the Supreme Court has the authority to increase the penalty imposed by the lower court upon appeal by the defendant. Whether the defendant is guilty of criminal attempt against an agent of the authorities under the Penal Code.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the inferior court and sentenced the defendant to be imprisoned for two years and six months of prision correccional, to suffer the accessory penalties, to pay a fine of 3,750 pesetas, and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment not exceeding one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the plea of autrefois acquit: The Court held that the plea of autrefois acquit was not valid. The offenses charged in the municipal court (violation of Ordinance No. 28 for disorderly conduct and assault on Domingo Salvador, and uttering abusive language to Captain Jose Crame) were distinct from the offense charged in the Court of First Instance (criminal attempt against Feliciano Celimin, a policeman, under the Penal Code). Even if the acts were the same, they constituted separate offenses punishable under different laws. The Court cited the doctrine that where the same acts constitute an offense against two sovereignties exercising jurisdiction over the same territory, a prosecution by one does not necessarily bar prosecution by the other, though this doctrine was not strictly necessary as the offenses were distinct. On the authority to increase the penalty: The Court affirmed its authority to modify or reverse the sentence of an inferior court and increase the penalty when the defendant appeals. The Court cited previous decisions establishing this power. It further referenced the Supreme Court of the United States' ruling in United States v. Trono, which held that when a defendant requests a new trial, he must accept the burden and benefit thereof, and cannot claim double jeopardy. The Court reiterated that it has the power to render the judgment that should have been rendered by the inferior court. On the guilt of the defendant: The Court found the defendant guilty of a violation of the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 249 of the Penal Code, to be punished under paragraph 5 of Article 250. The facts established that the defendant, while attending races, attempted to pass through a reserved gate, broke it open by force, and threw the attendant to the ground. When policeman Feliciano Celimin attempted to arrest him for this conduct, the defendant struck the policeman, used vile and abusive language, and resisted arrest. These actions constituted attacking and employing force against an agent of the authorities while discharging his duties, and offering grave resistance, thereby fulfilling the elements of the crime.
Main Doctrine
A plea of autrefois acquit is unavailing when the offenses charged in the prior and subsequent complaints, though arising from the same acts, are distinct and punishable under different laws, one being a violation of a municipal ordinance and the other an offense under the Penal Code.