Benedicto v. Perizuelo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An open account existed between the defendant, Julian Perizuelo, and Teodoro Benedicto. On September 30, 1894, the account was balanced, resulting in a sum of 4,559.05 Mexican pesos owed by Perizuelo to Benedicto. Perizuelo acknowledged this debt in writing, agreeing to pay 15% annual interest until settled. Procedural History: The plaintiff, as administrator of Benedicto's estate, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to recover the balance of the account, amounting to 4,559.05 Mexican pesos, with 15% interest from September 30, 1894. The defendant raised two defenses: a general denial and prescription. The trial court found that the debt had not prescribed due to the defendant's acknowledgment and rendered judgment for the plaintiff for 10,164.01 Mexican pesos (equivalent to 10,164.01 Philippine pesos), plus costs. The defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The Appeal: The defendant-appellant argued that the action had prescribed, relying on Articles 1966, 1972, and 1973 of the Civil Code, and the parties' mutual agreement to treat the case as one for rents. The appellant contended that more than five years had elapsed between the plaintiff's demands for payment. The plaintiff-appellee maintained that the debt was acknowledged and that the applicable prescriptive period was not five years.
Issue(s)
Whether the action to recover the acknowledged debt is barred by the statute of prescription. Whether the parties' agreement to treat the action as one for rents affects the applicable prescriptive period.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. It held that the action was not barred by the statute of prescription because the applicable prescriptive period for a personal action to recover a liquidated sum acknowledged in writing is fifteen years, as provided in Article 1964 of the Civil Code. The Court ruled that the parties' agreement to consider the action as one for rents did not alter the fundamental nature of the obligation, which was a debt acknowledged by the defendant.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court ruled that the action was not barred by the statute of prescription. The Court reasoned that the debt in question was a liquidated sum acknowledged in writing by the defendant, constituting a personal action for the recovery of money. According to Article 1964 of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for such personal actions is fifteen years. The Court found that this fifteen-year period had not elapsed at the time the action was filed. Therefore, the defendant's plea of prescription was untenable. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court held that the parties' mutual agreement to treat the action as one for rents did not affect the applicable prescriptive period. The Court explained that while the parties might have agreed to consider the nature of the action for the purposes of the trial, this agreement could not alter the inherent character of the obligation itself. The obligation was fundamentally a debt acknowledged in writing, not merely a claim for rents. Consequently, the prescriptive period provided for actions to recover rents under Article 1966 of the Civil Code was not applicable, and the longer, fifteen-year period under Article 1964 governed.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed that an action to recover a liquidated sum acknowledged in writing by the debtor is a personal action governed by the fifteen-year prescriptive period under Article 1964 of the Civil Code. The Court held that an agreement between the parties to consider the action as one for rents, which would fall under Article 1966, does not change the nature of the obligation and thus does not alter the applicable prescriptive period. The existence of an acknowledgment of debt, evidenced by a written statement, interrupts prescription and establishes the debtor's commitment to pay.