Ansaldo v. Fidelity & Surety Company
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands obtained a money judgment against Romarico Agcaoili and Angel A. Ansaldo in civil case No. 33923. A writ of execution was issued, and a notice of levy was placed on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7232 and 19165, pertaining to Angel A. Ansaldo's interest in certain properties. 2. Procedural History: Following the levy in 1933, no further action was taken by the appellant for over fourteen years. On July 30, 1947, Jose Ma. Ansaldo, alleging inheritance of the properties, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to cancel the notice of levy due to the appellant's inaction. The appellant opposed, asserting the liens remained valid. The Court of First Instance granted the cancellation, finding the appellant's right to enforce the judgment had prescribed. The appellant then filed the present appeal. 3. The Petition: The appellant contends that there is no law limiting the time for selling property already levied upon and cites Government vs. Echaus. The appellee argues, and the lower court agreed, that the judgment is barred by prescription under Section 6 of Rule 39 and Section 43 of Act No. 190, as more than ten years elapsed from the judgment's entry (or writ issuance) to the petition for cancellation. The appellant's argument that levy alone constitutes execution is also rejected, as execution requires both levy and sale under Section 14 of Rule 39.
Issue(s)
Whether the appellant's right to enforce its judgment by execution or action had prescribed. Whether a levy on property, without a subsequent sale, constitutes enforcement of a judgment.
Ruling
The Court affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, holding that the appellant's right to enforce its judgment had prescribed.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the appellant's right to enforce its judgment by execution or action had prescribed: The Court reiterated the rule under Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, stating that a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from its entry. Thereafter, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, it may be enforced by action. The prescriptive period for an action to enforce a judgment is ten years, commencing from the date the judgment is entered, not from the expiration of the five-year period for execution by motion. In this case, even assuming April 11, 1933, was the date of entry, more than ten years had elapsed by July 30, 1947, when the petition for cancellation was filed, thus barring the judgment by prescription. The Court explicitly stated that it found no plausible reason to depart from the established rule regarding the commencement of the ten-year prescriptive period. On whether a levy on property, without a subsequent sale, constitutes enforcement of a judgment: The Court found no merit in the appellant's contention that its judgment had already been executed after the properties were levied upon. Citing Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the Court clarified that an execution is enforced, and therefore accomplished, by levy and sale. A mere levy, without the subsequent sale, does not constitute full enforcement of the judgment. The appellant's reliance on the case of Government vs. Echaus was deemed misplaced because, in that cited case, the execution sale occurred within the ten-year period during which the judgment could be enforced by action, unlike the present case where the period had already expired.
Main Doctrine
A judgment creditor's right to enforce a judgment by execution is barred by prescription if no steps are taken within five years from its entry, and any subsequent enforcement must be by action within the ten-year prescriptive period from entry. A mere levy on property does not constitute enforcement of the judgment; it must be followed by a sale.