Ramos v. Mañalac
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns two parcels of land originally owned by the Ramos siblings. Their brother, Eladio Ramos, was granted a power of attorney to mortgage this property. He subsequently mortgaged the land along with another parcel to secure a loan of P300 with 12% annual interest. When Eladio Ramos failed to repay the loan, the mortgagee, Romualdo Rivera, initiated a foreclosure action. Procedural History: The foreclosure case (Civil Case No. 7668) proceeded with summons served only on Eladio Ramos, who acknowledged service for himself and his co-defendants. An attorney entered an appearance and filed an answer on behalf of all defendants. The Court of First Instance rendered a decision on August 24, 1939, ordering the payment of the debt and attorney's fees, and the foreclosure of the mortgage upon default. Eladio Ramos defaulted, leading to a public auction where Romualdo Rivera was the highest bidder. The sheriff issued a deed of sale, which was confirmed by the court on April 1, 1941. Romualdo Rivera later sold the properties to Felipa Lopez, who then sought and was granted a writ of possession on September 22, 1947. The petitioners, the Ramos siblings, refused to vacate the property, leading to contempt proceedings. The Petition: The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the order placing Felipa Lopez in possession and the original foreclosure decision. They argued that the writ of possession was issued more than five years after the judgment became final, rendering it void, and that the sale was illegal due to improper service of summons in the foreclosure suit. They contended that the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by issuing the writ of possession and by threatening them with contempt for refusing to vacate the premises.
Issue(s)
Whether the 1939 foreclosure judgment can be collaterally attacked on the ground of lack of service of summons. Whether the issuance of a writ of possession after the lapse of five years from the finality of judgment is valid under Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The claim that the 1939 decision is void constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on a judgment that is valid and regular on its face. Under Philippine jurisprudence, specifically the rule in Gomez v. Concepcion, a judgment that is ex facie valid can only be attacked in a separate action brought principally for that purpose. Furthermore, any defect in the service of summons was cured when Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez voluntarily appeared and answered the complaint on behalf of all the defendants. An attorney is presumed to have been authorized by the parties for whom he appears, and the security of judicial proceedings requires that this presumption be maintained unless overcome by clear evidence. This is especially true here, as the petitioners waited nine years before challenging the jurisdiction of the court after the judgment had been rendered. On Issue 2: The issuance of a writ of possession in a foreclosure proceeding is not an 'execution of judgment' as contemplated by Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Relying on the precedent in Rivera v. Rupac, the Court clarified that putting the purchaser in possession is a ministerial and complementary duty that the court can undertake even after the lapse of five years. This power rests on the principle that a court of equity, having obtained jurisdiction to decree a sale, retains jurisdiction to enforce its own decrees to avoid circuitous actions and vexatious litigation. Section 257 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now Rule 70, Section 3) provides that the confirmation of the sale operates to divest the parties of their rights and vests them in the purchaser, thus making it the court's duty to place the purchaser in possession. As long as the rights of third parties have not intervened, the court may issue the writ to put an end to the litigation.
Main Doctrine
The issuance of a writ of possession in foreclosure proceedings is a ministerial and complementary duty of the court, which can be undertaken even after the lapse of five years, provided the statute of limitations and the rights of third persons have not intervened. Such issuance is not an execution of judgment within the purview of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.