Tabanda v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An election case was filed between Fermin Tabanda (petitioner) and Tiburcio Rosal (respondent) for the position of mayor of San Vicente, Ilocos Sur. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance (CFI) of Ilocos Sur declared respondent Rosal as the elected mayor with a majority of three votes and dismissed the protest. The CFI ordered petitioner Tabanda to pay one-half of the costs, considering the protest was not wholly unfounded as the initial majority for Rosal was reduced. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the CA declared petitioner Tabanda elected with a majority of seven votes and decreed that each party shall bear their own expenses. The CA denied Tabanda's motion for reconsideration and subsequent motion for clarification, which sought to have respondent Rosal pay the costs in both instances. The Petition: Petitioner Tabanda filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in not taxing the costs against respondent Rosal.
Issue(s)
Whether the assessment of costs against the losing party in an election case under Section 180 of the Revised Election Code is mandatory. Whether Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court applies in a suppletory character to election cases regarding the discretionary division of costs.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is dismissed. The Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse its discretion. Each party shall bear their own expenses.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that Section 180 of the Revised Election Code (REC) is not intended to deprive the courts of their discretion in taxing costs. While the statute uses the word 'shall' in relation to assessing costs against the losing party, this provision merely authorizes the court to include election-specific expenses that would not otherwise be included under the general Rules of Court. The Court emphasized that there is no inconsistency between the REC and Rule 131, as the former provides the power to tax specific expenses while the latter provides the framework for judicial discretion in doing so. Depriving the court of this discretion would lead to inequitable results, particularly in close elections where protests are filed in good faith. The Court noted that automatically condemning a candidate to pay costs merely for filing a protest could discourage legitimate challenges to election results. Therefore, the language in Section 180 is not a mandatory command that overrides the court's power to assess equity. On Issue 2: The Court ruled that Section 1 of Rule 131 is applicable to election cases by virtue of Rule 132, which provides that the Rules of Court apply to election cases in a suppletory character whenever practicable and convenient. The Court explicitly rejected the petitioner's argument that Rule 132's exclusionary language prevents the application of Rule 131. Citing the precedent in Mandac v. Samonte (49 Phil. 284), the Court observed that the substantial similarity between the old Election Law and the current REC justifies the continued application of judicial discretion. In Mandac, the Court had previously allowed the division of costs among parties despite statutory language suggesting the defeated party should pay. The Court reasoned that in cases where the majority is slim—such as the three-vote margin initially found in this case—it is equitable for each party to bear their own costs. Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not ignore the law nor abuse its discretion in applying equitable principles to the assessment of expenses.
Main Doctrine
The court has the discretion to apportion costs in an election case, even if a party wins, based on equitable considerations, as provided by Section 1 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, which is not inconsistent with Section 180 of the Revised Election Code.