Reyes v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute involved a civil case, No. 6226, initiated in the Municipal Court of Manila. The petitioner-appellant, Maximo Reyes, was declared in default, and a decision was rendered against him in favor of the respondent-appellee, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. Procedural History: Following the default judgment on December 24, 1948, Reyes' motion to lift the default was denied by the Municipal Court on December 29, 1948. Reyes received a copy of the decision on January 4, 1949, and subsequently filed an exception and notice of appeal on January 6, 1949, which was given due course. However, the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed this appeal on March 14, 1949, ruling that Reyes had no right to appeal. Reyes then filed a petition for relief from the Municipal Court's judgment in the Court of First Instance on May 17, 1949, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. This petition was dismissed by the Court of First Instance on August 29, 1949, after a motion for reconsideration by the appellee. The present appeal stems from this dismissal order. The Petition: The petitioner-appellant sought relief from the Municipal Court's judgment pursuant to Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. The core of the appeal to the Supreme Court concerns the timeliness of this petition for relief. The appellant argued that the period for filing the petition should be suspended during the pendency of his attempted appeal from the Municipal Court's decision. The appellate court found this argument untenable, citing precedent that a defendant in default has no right to appeal, rendering the attempted appeal ineffectual and the petition for relief filed on May 17, 1949, excessively beyond the reglementary 60-day period from his learning of the judgment on January 4, 1949.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition for relief was filed within the reglementary period prescribed by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. Whether the pendency of an ineffectual appeal suspends the reglementary period for filing a petition for relief.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance dismissing the petition for relief. The petition was filed beyond the reglementary period, and the pendency of an ineffectual appeal does not suspend the time for filing a petition for relief.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the reglementary period for filing a petition for relief: The Court reiterated the rule under Section 3 of Rule 38 that a petition for relief must be filed "within sixty days after the petitioner learns of the judgement, order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six months after such judgement or order was entered, or such proceeding was taken." In this case, the appellant learned of the decision on January 4, 1949, and filed the petition for relief on May 17, 1949. This period of one hundred thirty-three days is excessively beyond the allowed sixty days, making the petition late by seventy-three days. On the issue of whether the pendency of an ineffectual appeal suspends the reglementary period: The Court found the appellant's contention that the period of his appeal should be deducted from the 60-day reglementary period to be untenable. The Court cited its ruling in Lim Toco vs. Go Fay (80 Phil., 166), which established that a defendant in default has no right to appeal from the judgment on the merits. Therefore, the appeal attempted by the appellant from the Municipal Court's decision was ineffectual. The Court of First Instance correctly dismissed the appeal based on this principle. Since the appeal was ineffectual, it could not have suspended the reglementary period for filing a petition for relief. The decision of the Municipal Court became final on January 19, 1949, fifteen days after the appellant received notice of the decision, as he had no right to appeal.
Main Doctrine
A petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court must be filed within sixty days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six months after such judgment or order was entered, or such proceeding was taken. An appeal by a defendant in default is ineffectual and does not suspend the reglementary period for filing a petition for relief.