Raymundo Transportation v. Cervo

G.R. No. L-3899 · 1952-05-21 · J. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: · Primary: Commercial; Secondary: Administrative Law
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Victorino Cervo secured an emergency certificate of public convenience to operate a one-auto truck from Pililla to Manila. This certificate was extended indefinitely after its expiration. Cervo filed a petition for conversion into a permanent certificate. Procedural History: Raymundo Transportation Co., Inc. (petitioner) opposed Cervo's application, arguing no need for additional service, willingness to provide it, and the potential for ruinous competition. The Public Service Commission, after receiving evidence through Chief Attorney Antonio H. Aspillera, granted the permanent certificate. A motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for review, assigning errors concerning the delegation of authority to receive evidence and the merits of granting the permanent certificate.

Issue(s)

Whether the Public Service Commission's delegation of evidence reception to the Chief Attorney in a contested case constitutes a reversible error when raised for the first time on appeal. Whether the 'Old Operator Rule' grants an established operator an absolute right to prevent the permanent certification of an emergency operator. Whether the granting of a certificate to a new operator constitutes ruinous competition against an existing operator.

Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Public Service Commission, granting the permanent certificate of public convenience to Victorino Cervo. The petition for review was denied.

Ratio Decidendi

On Issue 1: The Supreme Court acknowledged that the delegation of authority to a Chief Attorney to receive evidence in a contested case is indeed improper based on recent jurisprudence. However, the Court ruled that under Rule 43, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, an appellant can only raise questions in a petition for review that were previously raised before the Commission. Since the Petitioner submitted itself to trial and presented its evidence before the Chief Attorney without objection, it cannot raise this procedural defect for the first time on appeal. On Issue 2: The Court held that while the 'Old Operator Rule' is generally tenable, it is not an absolute shield against new operators. In this specific context, emergency operators like Cervo filled a critical void in public transportation when established operators were unable to rehabilitate their pre-war equipment. Depriving an emergency operator of their privilege after they have invested money and effort—simply to favor an old operator who only recently resumed full service—would be unfair, unjust, and would essentially sanction a monopoly. On Issue 3: The Court clarified that the existence of competition does not automatically equate to ruinous competition. Ruinous competition is a question of fact that depends on the requirements of the traveling public; if public necessity demands additional service, the resulting competition is considered wholesome and constructive because it promotes efficiency and better management. The findings of the Public Service Commission regarding public necessity are findings of fact which, if supported by sufficient evidence as they are here, will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court.

Main Doctrine

While the delegation of authority to receive evidence in a contested case before the Public Service Commission is generally improper, such objection cannot be raised for the first time on appeal if the party submitted to the proceedings without objection. Public necessity and convenience are paramount, and the Public Service Commission may grant additional permits even to new operators if public demand warrants, without such action necessarily constituting ruinous competition. Preference to old operators is not absolute and should not lead to injustice or monopoly.

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