Rodriguez v. Tan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. sought to collect P18,400 in salaries and allowances and P35,524.55 in damages from defendant Carlos Tan. Plaintiff alleged that defendant usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines from December 30, 1947, to December 27, 1949, during which period defendant collected salaries and emoluments. Plaintiff further claimed that the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) declared him duly elected on December 16, 1949, and that he incurred expenses prosecuting the protest. Procedural History: Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the SET judgment was a bar to the action under the principle of res judicata and that the SET had denied plaintiff's claim for expenses. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The Petition: Plaintiff appealed the dismissal order, contending that the defendant, as a de facto officer, should reimburse the salaries and emoluments received to the plaintiff, who was legally declared elected.
Issue(s)
Whether a de facto officer, proclaimed elected and who discharged the duties of Senator, can be ordered to reimburse the salaries and emoluments received during incumbency to the plaintiff who was legally declared elected by the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Whether the SET's judgment denying the claim for expenses constitutes res judicata for the present action.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal. The Court held that the defendant, having been proclaimed elected by the Commission on Elections, took the oath of office, and discharged the duties of Senator, was a de facto officer entitled to the compensation, emoluments, and allowances provided by the Constitution. The Court found no statute in the jurisdiction that would authorize the adoption of the rule advocated by the plaintiff, which holds that salaries and emoluments follow legal title. Furthermore, the Court considered the SET's silence on the claim for expenses as a denial, thus constituting res judicata.
Ratio Decidendi
On the entitlement of a de facto officer to salaries and emoluments: The Court held that the defendant, having been proclaimed elected by the Commission on Elections, took the oath of office, and discharged the duties of Senator, was a de facto officer. As such, he was entitled to the compensation, emoluments, and allowances provided by the Constitution for the position. The Court reasoned that the emolument must go to the person who rendered service unless the contrary is provided, and there was no averment in the complaint that the defendant was linked with any irregularity vitiating his election. This aligns with the policy and rule consistently followed in the jurisdiction regarding persons elected but later ousted through election protests, where the right of the elected person to compensation during incumbency has always been recognized. The Court distinguished this from cases where express statutory provisions or common law principles in other jurisdictions mandated reimbursement to the de jure officer, noting the absence of such in Philippine law. On the application of res judicata: The Court considered the defendant's contention that the plaintiff had already raised the claim for reimbursement of salaries and emoluments in the protest case before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). Although the SET rendered judgment on the merits, it passed over this matter sub silentio. The Court interpreted this silence as a denial of the relief sought. This interpretation was based on the SET's ample and unlimited jurisdiction over election cases, and when it chose to ignore the claim, the implication was that it deemed it unjustified. Therefore, the matter could not be passed upon again in the present action, following the doctrine of res judicata.
Main Doctrine
A de facto officer, who assumes office after being proclaimed elected and discharges its duties, is entitled to the compensation, emoluments, and allowances thereof, even if later declared not duly elected by the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The salaries and emoluments follow the legal title to the office only when there is a statutory provision or common law principle in the jurisdiction mandating such.