Torrefiel v. Toriano
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiffs Generosa Torrefiel and Juan Torrefiel filed an action for partition of a lot on May 19, 1949. After the defendants answered with counterclaims, Paulina Torrefiel filed a complaint in intervention claiming compensation for alleged services rendered to the defendants. Procedural History: The case was set for trial on September 20, 1950. On September 16, 1950, the plaintiffs' and intervenor's counsel filed a motion for indefinite postponement, with the conformity of the defendants' counsel, on the ground that Generosa Torrefiel "would not be able to attend the trial." On the scheduled date, none of the parties appeared except the plaintiffs' and intervenor's counsel. The court refused to postpone the hearing beyond 10:00 a.m. The plaintiffs' counsel, after notifying opposing counsel, left to find his clients. Upon returning at 10:20 a.m. with the intervenor, the case had already been dismissed at 10:10 a.m. due to the non-appearance of the plaintiffs and their counsel when the case was called. The Petition: On September 26, 1950, the plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, new trial, and relief from the court's order dated September 20, 1950, reciting the facts and stating that Juan Torrefiel was sick and Generosa Torrefiel was "busy." The court denied the motion, leading to this appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Whether the dismissal should have been without prejudice.
Ruling
The appealed order is affirmed with the modification that the dismissal will not be a bar to the filing of a new action and a new complaint in intervention upon the same subject matters, without special finding as to costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: The matter of adjournments and postponements of trials lies within the sound discretion of the courts, and such discretion will not be interfered with unless a grave abuse thereof is shown. The court's action in dismissing the case was not arbitrary, as the adverse party's conformity to a motion for postponement is not binding on the court. The trial of cases with reasonable dispatch is as much the concern of the judges as of the parties. The case was over a year old, and the reason for postponement, that Generosa Torrefiel "would not be able to attend the trial," was vague and did not specify why she could not attend or that her attendance was necessary. If sickness was the reason, it should have been shown by affidavit that her presence was indispensable and the character of her illness made attendance impossible, as required by Rule 31, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. On the issue of dismissal without prejudice: Inasmuch as it did not appear that the motion for postponement was due to any deliberate desire on the part of the plaintiffs and intervenor to delay the proceedings, or that the action was frivolous, at least as far as Juan Torrefiel was concerned, and considering that the defendants' attorney had expressly agreed to the plaintiffs' motion, the interest of justice and of the court could have been served with a dismissal of the case without prejudice. Therefore, the appealed order is affirmed with the modification that the dismissal will not be a bar to the filing of a new action and a new complaint in intervention upon the same subject matters.
Main Doctrine
The matter of adjournments and postponements of trials lies within the sound discretion of the courts, and such discretion will not be interfered with unless a grave abuse thereof is shown. The adverse party's conformity to a motion for postponement is not binding on the court, as the trial of cases with reasonable dispatch is a concern of the judges as well as the parties. However, in the interest of justice, a dismissal may be made without prejudice, especially when the motion for postponement was not due to a deliberate desire to delay proceedings and the adverse party had expressly agreed to the motion.