Bracamonte v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute involved a civil case, No. 488, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. The petitioners, Rosa Bracamonte and Eugenio Calderon, were the plaintiffs in this action, seeking relief based on a Deed of Sale. The initial judgment in this case was rendered on September 3, 1949, dismissing the plaintiffs' action. 2. Procedural History: Following the dismissal of their case on September 3, 1949, the petitioners received notice on September 13, 1949. They filed a motion for a new trial on September 19, 1949, which was denied on October 7, 1949. The petitioners received notice of this denial on the same day. Subsequently, on October 31, 1949, they filed a notice of appeal and an appeal bond. However, the record on appeal was not filed until November 7, 1949, which was seven days beyond the reglementary period. The respondent opposed the approval of the record on appeal. The petitioners attempted to justify the delay by citing their counsel's relocation to Cebu City due to political persecution and a subsequent typhoon. Judge Eduardo Enriquez dismissed the appeal on November 26, 1949, for being filed out of time. On December 7, 1949, the petitioners filed an ex parte motion for relief, seeking to set aside the original judgment due to alleged honest mistake and excusable negligence in failing to present the original Deed of Sale. This motion was denied by Judge Jose Teodoro, Sr. An amended record on appeal was filed on February 12, 1950, but this was disallowed by Judge Teodoro on February 18, 1950. A motion for reconsideration of this disallowance was also denied on March 17, 1950. 3. The Petition: The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion by Judges Enriquez and Teodoro in dismissing their appeal and disallowing the amended record on appeal. The Court of Appeals denied this petition. The petitioners have now appealed to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling. Specifically, they contend that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in finding that they failed to perfect their appeal, given the circumstances surrounding the filing of the amended record on appeal, notice of appeal, and appeal bond. They also argue that their motion for relief should have been considered to address the dismissal of their appeal due to force majeure, rather than seeking to set aside the original judgment. The Supreme Court, however, found that the motion for relief was not directed against the order dismissing the appeal, and that the Court of Appeals' factual finding regarding the defense of force majeure was conclusive.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioners perfected their appeal within the reglementary period. Whether the motion for relief filed by the petitioners was the proper remedy to set aside the judgment of dismissal of the appeal. Whether the delay in filing the record on appeal was due to force majeure or excusable negligence.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the appeal was not perfected on time and that the motion for relief was improperly filed. The Court found that the petitioners failed to perfect their appeal based on the record before the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, the Court clarified that a motion for relief under Rule 38 is intended to set aside a judgment or order due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable negligence, and it should be directed against the order that prevents the perfection of an appeal, not against the original judgment itself when the appeal has already been dismissed for being out of time. The Court also upheld the CA's factual finding against the petitioners' defense of force majeure.
Ratio Decidendi
On the perfection of appeal: The Court held that based on the record before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners failed to perfect their appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that in addition to the record on appeal, the petitioners should have filed a notice of appeal and an appeal bond within the reglementary period. The copy of the amended record on appeal attached to the petition for certiorari in the CA did not contain these documents, while they were present in the copy attached to the petition for review before the Supreme Court. This discrepancy led the CA to correctly find that the petitioners failed to perfect their appeal on the basis of the record before it. On the propriety of the motion for relief: The Court distinguished the petitioners' motion for relief from the one discussed in Medran vs. Court of Appeals. The motion for relief in the Medran case was for the purpose of obtaining a revocation of the order dismissing the appeal for failure to file an appeal bond in due time. In the present case, the petitioners sought in their motion for relief the setting aside of the original judgment of September 3, 1949, and not the revocation of the order disapproving their record on appeal. The Court emphasized that a motion for relief should be directed against the order preventing the perfection of an appeal. The petitioners' strategy of filing a motion for relief to set aside the original judgment, instead of directly challenging the dismissal of their appeal, was seen as an attempt to renew their original appeal, which had already been dismissed for being out of time. The Court reiterated the principle that what cannot be done directly should not be done indirectly. On the defense of force majeure: The Court noted that apart from any procedural objections, the Court of Appeals found as a matter of fact that the petitioners' defense of force majeure was not tenable. This factual finding by the CA was considered conclusive in the present appeal by certiorari. Therefore, the alleged delay caused by the attorney's relocation to Cebu City and the subsequent typhoon did not excuse the late filing of the record on appeal.
Main Doctrine
A motion for relief under Rule 38 is intended to set aside a judgment or order that was rendered due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable negligence, and it should be directed against the order that prevents the perfection of an appeal, not against the original judgment itself when the appeal has already been dismissed for being out of time.