Silva v. Ocampo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Belen Cabrera applied for a certificate of public convenience to operate an ice plant in Lipa City. Eliseo Silva opposed the application, asserting his existing ice plant adequately met public needs. Procedural History: The Public Service Commission (PSC) initially granted Cabrera's application based on evidence received by Attorney Antonio H. Aspillera. On appeal, the Supreme Court found the proceedings before Aspillera null and void for violating Section 3 of the Public Service Act and remanded the case for re-hearing. The Petition: During the re-hearing before Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo, Cabrera's counsel sought to re-submit the evidence previously presented before Aspillera. Silva objected, arguing that re-submission required mutual agreement. Commissioner Ocampo allowed the re-submission, ruling that the applicant had the right to either re-submit former evidence or present new evidence (de novo), and revised Aspillera's prior rulings. Based on this re-submitted evidence, Ocampo granted Cabrera a provisional permit. Silva's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this petition for certiorari.
Issue(s)
Whether Commissioner Ocampo committed an abuse of discretion in allowing the re-submission of evidence over the oppositor's objection, contrary to the Supreme Court's directive. Whether the evidence re-submitted, despite being admitted in violation of the Supreme Court's directive, could serve as a basis for the issuance of a provisional permit.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Supreme Court held that while the re-submission of evidence was erroneous for the purpose of a final decision, it could serve as a basis for a provisional permit. The case was ordered to be set for hearings for trial de novo.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of abuse of discretion in re-submitting evidence: The Court found that Commissioner Ocampo's interpretation of the previous Supreme Court ruling was erroneous. The directive to return the case for re-hearing was intended to allow the Commission itself to receive and appreciate the evidence, which mere re-submission without agreement would not achieve. The Court stated that the rationale was to enable the Commission to have the necessary opportunity for observation and appreciation of the evidence to reach an accurate conclusion. The privilege to re-submit evidence was explicitly stated to be an exception requiring the agreement of both parties. Therefore, overruling the petitioner's objection to the re-submission constituted an abuse of discretion. On the issue of using re-submitted evidence for a provisional permit: The Court held that while the evidence was admitted in violation of the directive for a final decision, it could still justify the issuance of a provisional permit. The Court noted that there is nothing in the law prohibiting the Commission from receiving pertinent evidence for the purpose of acting on a petition for a provisional permit. The law is silent on the procedure for provisional permits, and the Commission is even empowered to act on certain matters of public interest without a hearing. Citing Peck vs. Public Utilities Commission, the Court affirmed that temporary or emergency orders are permissible to meet urgent public necessity. The Court also cited Javellana vs. La Paz Ice Plant and Cold Storage Co. and Ablaza Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Pampanga Bus Inc. to support the Commission's power to grant temporary or provisional permits for urgent public necessity.
Main Doctrine
While the re-submission of evidence in violation of a Supreme Court directive may be erroneous for the purpose of a final decision, such evidence may still serve as a basis for the issuance of a provisional permit if the Commission finds it warrants such action, as there is no express prohibition in law against receiving pertinent evidence for provisional permits.