Rovero v. Amparo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Tranquilino Rovero arrived at the Makati Air Port from Bangkok, Siam, with several pieces of baggage, including a Chinese vase declared at P15. Customs officials retained the vase and other baggage due to suspicion of undeclared merchandise. Upon examination, the vase was found to have a false bottom containing 259 pieces of jewelry, appraised at P23,736. Rovero admitted ownership of the jewelry, which he purchased in Bangkok for $4,353, and admitted concealing them, citing fear of robbery and inability to pay duties. The jewelry was seized as property subject to forfeiture under Section 1363 (m-2) in relation to Section 1292 of the Revised Administrative Code. Procedural History: Rovero was found guilty of violating Section 2703 of the Revised Administrative Code and sentenced to pay a fine of P2,500. The Commissioner of Customs, in Identification Case No. 555, declared the seizure of the jewelry proper and subject to forfeiture, but waived forfeiture under Section 1365 of the Revised Administrative Code, imposing a fine equal to three times the appraised value. Rovero appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI), which affirmed the Commissioner's decision. Rovero further appealed to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-3281), which also affirmed the CFI decision on June 28, 1951. The Petition: After the Supreme Court's decision became final, Rovero petitioned for a reappraisal of the jewelry. A Committee on Reappraisement was formed, which reappraised the jewelry at P9,880. The Secretary of Finance authorized setting aside the original appraisement and collecting duties and fines based on the reappraised value. The Solicitor-General moved for execution of the CFI decision. Rovero opposed, claiming the judgment was satisfied by paying the fine based on the reappraised value. Judge Amparo of the CFI ordered the execution, finding the judgment not fully paid. Motions for reconsideration were denied. Rovero filed the present petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction to seek relief from Judge Amparo's orders.
Issue(s)
Whether the Commissioner of Customs, after a final judgment by the Supreme Court, can order a reappraisal of seized goods to reduce the fine imposed. Whether Section 1369 of the Revised Administrative Code allows the Commissioner of Customs to compromise a final judgment in favor of the Government. Whether the original appraisal of the jewelry was material and final.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The resolution of dismissal dated February 15, 1952, stands. The motion for reconsideration is denied.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of reappraisal after final judgment: The Court held that once a court decision becomes final, neither the Secretary of Finance nor the Commissioner of Customs may have the goods reappraised for the purpose of reducing the amount of the fine. The Court emphasized that the supervision and control over judicial proceedings granted to the Commissioner of Customs under Section 1368 of the Revised Administrative Code cannot extend to modifying a final decision of a court. The Commissioner's role after a final judgment is to carry out its terms and protect the Government's interests, not to alter the adjudicated amount. The original appraisal, being the basis for the fine, was material and became final when Rovero failed to protest it within the prescribed period and when the case was appealed to the courts, thereby transferring jurisdiction from administrative officials to the judiciary. On the issue of compromise under Section 1369: The Court ruled that the Commissioner of Customs, acting as a mere agent of the Government and a trustee of funds, cannot accept anything less than what is adjudicated in favor of the Government unless expressly authorized by law or his principal. The right to compromise under Section 1369 of the Revised Administrative Code is applicable only to cases pending and not finally decided. In this case, the litigation had concluded with a final judgment from the Supreme Court, rendering the period for compromise over. The Court cited Matsui Sawhatsu & Mori vs. Hammond to support the principle that Section 1369 refers to cases not finally decided. The Court also distinguished the situation from cases where the Secretary of the Treasury in the U.S. had authority to remit fines, noting the absence of similar authority for the Secretary of Finance or Commissioner of Customs in the Philippines. On the materiality and finality of the original appraisal: The Court found that the original appraisal of P23,736 was material from the beginning because the fine imposed on Rovero was based on this appraisal. Even if Rovero had won the case, he would still have to pay ordinary customs duties based on this appraisal. The claim that the appraisal was not material and was never questioned was rejected. The Court noted that Rovero had approximately four years to question the appraisal but failed to do so. Furthermore, once the administrative proceedings were transferred to the Court of First Instance upon appeal, the authority of the Commissioner of Customs to order a reappraisal ended, and the original appraisal had to stand as final until modified by the courts.
Main Doctrine
Once a court decision involving customs seizure and fines becomes final, neither the Secretary of Finance nor the Commissioner of Customs can reappraise the goods to reduce the fine, nor can they compromise or remit fines, as their authority ends with the final court decision, and their subsequent function is merely to carry out its terms.