Joven v. Director of Land
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners-appellees Vicente Joven y Monteverde, et al. sought to register Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of plan Psu-111150, claiming ownership as accretion to their adjoining lots. These lots were admittedly formed and added to the shores by the natural action of the sea. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment declaring the applicants as owners of the lots, with exceptions for portions ceded to private individuals and reserved for public improvements. The lower court ratified its order of general default against the Director of Lands. The Petition: The Director of Lands appealed the judgment, arguing that the declaration of ownership by accretion was improper.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of First Instance could declare applicants owners of lands formed by accretion. Whether the cession of portions of the lots to private individuals by the Director of Lands implied that the remaining portions were not needed for public utility.
Ruling
The appealed judgment is reversed. The application for registration is denied, and the land in question is declared as belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the Court of First Instance could declare applicants owners of lands formed by accretion: The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's ruling. It held that under Article 4 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, lands added to the shores by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain. While these lands may eventually be declared property of adjacent owners if not needed for public utility, special industries, or coast-guard services, this declaration can only be made by the Executive and possibly the Legislative departments. The courts are not primarily called upon, nor in a position, to make such a determination. The lower court's reliance on the Jularbal case was misplaced, as the circumstances there, involving homestead applications, differed from the present case where the land was not applied for or ceded as a homestead. The fact that certain portions were ceded to private persons by the Director of Lands does not automatically mean the remaining portions could be disposed of similarly or in favor of adjoining owners. The Court cited Natividad vs. Director of Land to support the exclusive power of the Executive and Legislative departments in making such declarations. On whether the cession of portions of the lots to private individuals implied they were not needed for public utility: The Court found that the cession of certain portions of the lots to private individuals by the Director of Lands did not necessarily imply that the remaining portions were not needed by the Government. The Court noted that the City of Davao intended to utilize part of the land for certain projects and public improvements. Therefore, such cessions did not constitute an implied declaration that the entire lots were no longer required for public purposes as contemplated by the Law of Waters.
Main Doctrine
Lands added to the shores by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain. The declaration that such lands are no longer needed for public utility, special industries, or coast-guard services, and can be granted to adjacent owners, can only be made by the Executive and possibly the Legislative departments, not by the courts.