Hermosa v. Longara
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Epifanio M. Longara presented claims against the intestate estate of Fernando Hermosa, Sr. for credit advances made to the intestate (P2,341.41 from 1932-1944) and to his son Francisco Hermosa (P12,924.12) and grandson Fernando Hermosa, Jr. (P3,772 from 1945-1947). The advances were made on the condition that payment would be made by Fernando Hermosa, Sr. as soon as he received funds from the sale of his property in Spain. Procedural History: The Court of Appeals approved the claims, finding that the condition for payment was met when the administratrix received P20,000 from the buyer of the property in October 1947, which was subsequently paid. The claim was filed on October 2, 1948. The Petition: Petitioners appealed, contending that the obligation was subject to a purely potestative condition, making it null and void under Article 1115 of the old Civil Code, and that the action had prescribed.
Issue(s)
Whether the condition for payment was purely potestative or mixed. Whether the obligation became due and demandable upon the sale of the property in Spain, even if it occurred after the debtor's death. Whether the claim for advances made to the grandson after the intestate's death is valid. Whether the claims are barred by the statute of non-claims.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in approving the claims for P2,341.41 and P12,924.12, but reversed the approval of the claim for P3,772. The Court held that the condition was mixed, not purely potestative, and that the action had not prescribed. The claim for advances to the grandson was reversed as the obligation to support is personal and extinguished upon death, and an agent's authority terminates upon the principal's death. The issue of the statute of non-claims was not considered as it was not raised in the lower courts.
Ratio Decidendi
On the nature of the condition: The Court held that the condition "as soon as he (intestate) receive funds derived from the sale of his property in Spain" was not purely potestative. It reasoned that the condition did not depend exclusively on the debtor's will but also on external circumstances, specifically the presence of a buyer willing and able to purchase the property under the intestate's desired conditions. The Court distinguished this from purely potestative conditions like "if he decides to sell" or "if he likes to pay," which depend solely on the debtor's discretion. The Court classified it as a mixed condition, dependent partly on the debtor's will (the intent to sell) and partly on chance (the availability of a buyer). On the effect of the condition and retroaction: The Court explained that as a suspensive condition, the obligation to pay became due and demandable only upon the happening of the condition, which was the sale of the property and receipt of the proceeds. Applying the principle of retroaction of effects under Article 1114 of the old Civil Code and Sanchez Roman's commentary, the Court stated that the fulfillment of the suspensive condition retroacts to the time the contract was entered into. Therefore, all amounts advanced from the time of the agreement became due upon the sale, and the statute of limitations began to run from the date the money became available, meaning the action had not prescribed. On the claim for advances to the grandson: The Court found merit in reversing the approval of the P3,772 claim for advances made to the intestate's grandson after the intestate's death. The Court reasoned that the obligation to furnish support is personal and extinguished upon the death of the person obliged to give support, pursuant to Article 150 of the old Civil Code. Furthermore, an agent's authority or authorization is terminated upon the death of the principal, as per Article 1732 of the old Civil Code, meaning any authorization to furnish necessaries to the grandson could not extend beyond the intestate's death. On the statute of non-claims: The Court noted that the contention regarding the statute of non-claims was not raised in the lower courts. Consequently, under its rules, the Supreme Court was without authority to consider this issue at that stage of the proceedings, adhering to the principle that issues not raised in the trial court cannot generally be raised for the first time on appeal.
Main Doctrine
A condition for the payment of an obligation is considered a mixed condition, not purely potestative, if its fulfillment depends not only on the will of the debtor but also on other circumstances beyond his control, such as the presence of a buyer willing to purchase the property under the debtor's desired conditions. The fulfillment of a suspensive condition retroacts to the date of the contract, making the obligation demandable and the statute of limitations begin to run from that date.