Woodcraft Works v. Moscoso
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Jose Abesamis filed an action for rescission of a contract to supply lumber and for damages against Woodcraft Works, Ltd. (Woodcraft). Woodcraft was served summons on September 18, 1951. Procedural History: On October 13, Woodcraft moved for a bill of particulars. At the hearing on October 16, no one appeared for Woodcraft, and the attorney for Abesamis moved to have Woodcraft declared in default. The court, on the same day, issued an order declaring Woodcraft in default and denying its motion for a bill of particulars as filed out of time. Woodcraft was not notified of this order. Subsequently, the court allowed Abesamis to present evidence and rendered judgment awarding P128,604.14 to Abesamis. The Petition: On December 13, Woodcraft filed a motion to set aside the order and judgment, alleging illegality and invalidity due to the premature declaration of default and the subsequent void judgment. The motion was denied. Woodcraft then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court to annul the order and judgment and to prevent the execution thereof.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by declaring the petitioner in default despite the timely filing of a motion for a bill of particulars. Whether certiorari is the proper remedy given that the petitioner could have appealed the denial of the motion to set aside the default.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The order declaring petitioner in default and the subsequent judgment are set aside.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court clarified that under Rule 9, Section 1, a defendant has fifteen days from the service of summons to file an answer. Rule 16, Section 1 allows a party to move for a bill of particulars before responding to a pleading; this period is co-extensive with the 15-day period for the answer whenever a responsive pleading is permitted. Since the petitioner was served on September 18 and filed its motion on October 1 (the 13th day), the motion was filed within the reglementary period. Rule 16, Section 2 explicitly provides that the filing of such a motion interrupts the running of the period to answer. The trial court arbitrarily held that the petitioner only had ten days to file the motion, which is a rule applicable only when no responsive pleading is permitted. Because the petitioner still had the remainder of its 15-day period (at least five days) after the notice of denial of the motion, the declaration of default on October 16 was illegal and void for being premature. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court recognized the general rule that certiorari does not lie when the remedy of appeal is available. However, this rule is not absolute and may be relaxed in the interest of justice, particularly when a writ of execution has already been issued and is in the process of being carried out. The Court cited Saludes v. Pajarillo to support the principle that where an invalid judgment is already being executed, the delay inherent in an appeal makes it an inadequate remedy. In this case, the premature default deprived the petitioner of its day in court, necessitating the immediate intervention of the High Court to prevent the enforcement of a void judgment. The procedural error of the lower court was so grave that it constituted an excess of jurisdiction, making certiorari a valid and necessary vehicle for relief.
Main Doctrine
A court commits grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it declares a defendant in default before the reglementary period for filing an answer has expired, especially when a motion for a bill of particulars has been filed within the said period, which motion interrupts the period to file an answer.