Villa v. Fabricante
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff-appellant Felix de Villa filed a suit to foreclose a mortgage against defendants-appellees Cesareo A. Fabricante and Maria G. de Fabricante. The complaint alleged that on April 18, 1944, the defendants executed a deed of mortgage on two parcels of land to secure a loan of P150,000, payable between April 19, 1948, and April 19, 1950. The mortgage was recorded and annotated on the certificates of title. However, both the original and duplicate certificates of title were lost or destroyed during the war. A copy of the deed of mortgage was saved by the notary public. Procedural History: The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the Court of First Instance. The grounds for dismissal were (a) that the certificates of title were destroyed and not reconstituted, and (b) that the action was premature due to the Debt Moratorium Law. The Petition: The plaintiff appealed the order of dismissal.
Issue(s)
Whether the destruction of the certificates of title and the lack of reconstitution thereof bar an action to foreclose a mortgage. Whether the action was premature by reason of the Debt Moratorium Law.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal, remanding the case for further proceedings. The Court held that the action was not barred by the destruction of the titles and that the Debt Moratorium Law was no longer in operation.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of destroyed certificates of title: The Court held that a mortgage and its registration may be proven by secondary evidence upon proof of their execution and loss or destruction. The Court cited Section 51, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, which allows proof by a recital of their contents in some authentic documents or by the recollection of witnesses. The plaintiff stated he would present such evidence. The Court clarified that Republic Act No. 26, concerning the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title, does not preclude the use of secondary evidence when reconstitution is impossible. It was emphasized that the intent of the law was not to leave creditors without a remedy. The Court also noted that even without the mortgage, the averments regarding the loan and its maturity, if proven true, would constitute a clear cause of action for a simple debt. On the issue of the Debt Moratorium Law: The Court held that the Debt Moratorium Law (Republic Act No. 342) was no longer in operation. This ruling was based on the Court's previous decision in Rutter vs. Esteban, G.R. No. L-3708, May 18, 1953. Therefore, the action was not premature by reason of the moratorium.
Main Doctrine
A mortgage and its registration may be proven by secondary evidence upon proof of their execution and loss or destruction, and the Debt Moratorium Law is no longer in operation.