Bimeda v. Perez
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Salvador E. Bimeda was declared elected municipal mayor of Pamplona, Camarines Sur, by a plurality of one vote in the November 13, 1951 elections. Respondent Arcadio Perez contested the election. Procedural History: In his answer, respondent Perez filed a counter-protest, alleging wholesale irregularity and gross violation of election law by the board of inspectors in Precinct No. 6 of Pamplona, which he claimed deprived him of 20 or more votes. When the protestee (Bimeda) sought to present evidence to support this counter-protest after the protestant (Perez) had concluded his evidence, the respondent Judge, sustaining the protestant's opposition, disallowed the evidence. The Judge's theory was that allowing such proof would effectively disfranchise 200 or more voters if the purpose was to annul the election in that precinct. The Petition: Petitioner Bimeda filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction, seeking to compel the respondent Judge to allow him to adduce evidence regarding the alleged irregularity in Precinct No. 6 and to restrain the Judge from proceeding with the trial of the protest pending determination of the issue raised. The Supreme Court issued the injunction.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in disallowing the protestee's evidence on alleged irregularities in Precinct No. 6, thereby making the order correctible by certiorari. Whether the protestee's counter-protest sufficiently pleaded the alleged irregularities to warrant the presentation of evidence.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari and mandamus is denied. The writ of injunction issued by the Supreme Court is dissolved. The order of the respondent Judge disallowing the evidence is considered a mere error of judgment, correctible by appeal, not by certiorari.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the respondent Judge's order disallowing the protestee's evidence was a mere error of judgment, not an act of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The Court distinguished between errors of jurisdiction, which are reviewable by certiorari, and errors of judgment, which are correctible by appeal. It cited established jurisprudence that errors of jurisdiction render an order void or voidable, while errors of judgment or procedure do not necessarily warrant reversal. The Court emphasized that a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal, especially when the latter is an adequate remedy. In this case, the petitioner was still holding the contested office, and any delay from an appeal would not work irreparable injustice. Therefore, certiorari was not the proper remedy. On Issue 2: While the Court noted that the protestant's opposition was partly based on the vagueness of the counter-protest's averments regarding the alleged irregularities, it clarified that this was not the ground relied upon by the respondent Judge. The Judge's ruling was based on the perceived futility of the evidence, not on the insufficiency of the pleading. The Court suggested that the pleading defect could have been cured by amendment. However, the primary reason for denying the petition was the nature of the Judge's error as one of judgment, making appeal the appropriate remedy.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court reiterated that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that lies only when a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by appeal. The Court stressed that if an appeal is available and adequate, certiorari will not lie, as it is not a substitute for the lost appeal.