Dayrit v. Piccio
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the adoption of a minor, Lydia Duran, by Norberto L. Dayrit and Flora Regner Dayrit. The adoptive parents, who have no children of their own and possess ample resources, sought to adopt the five-year-old girl. The natural mother, Lutgarda Duran, provided her written and sworn consent to the adoption. The adoption proceedings were initiated in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided over by Judge Edmundo S. Piccio, initially granted the adoption decree on January 27, 1951. However, on January 3, 1952, Francisco L. Dayrit, the alleged natural father, and Lutgarda Duran filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that Francisco L. Dayrit's consent was essential as the natural father. Judge Piccio revoked the adoption order on February 4, 1952, and scheduled the case for a hearing on its merits. A subsequent motion for reconsideration of this revocation order was denied on March 20, 1952. The Petition: The adoptive parents, Norberto L. Dayrit and Flora Regner Dayrit, filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court on April 4, 1952. They sought to nullify the February 4, 1952 order that revoked the adoption decree, arguing that the lower court judge exceeded his jurisdiction by revoking a final order beyond the statutory period. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary prohibitory injunction on May 12, 1952, and the petition raises the question of whether the judge had the authority to revoke the adoption decree after it had become final, considering the provisions of Rule 38 regarding motions for reconsideration and the legal requirements for parental consent in adoption cases, particularly when the natural father has abandoned the child and not legally recognized it.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to revoke the adoption decree after it had become final and executory. Whether the consent of the natural father was essential for the adoption of the minor, Lydia Duran.
Ruling
The Court declared the order of revocation null and void and made the preliminary prohibitory injunction permanent, with costs against Francisco L. Dayrit.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of jurisdiction to revoke the adoption decree: The Honorable Judge Piccio exceeded his jurisdiction in revoking the adoption decree on February 4, 1952, which had become final and executory. According to Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a motion for the annulment of a judgment or order must be presented within sixty days after the aggrieved party learns of the judgment or order, and not more than six months after it was entered. Judicial controversies must have an end, and decisions become final after the lapse of the period for appeal, placing them beyond the control or jurisdiction of the courts. The revocation order was issued one year and eight days after the original decree, far beyond the statutory period for reconsideration or modification. This principle is supported by established jurisprudence, emphasizing the finality of judgments. On the necessity of the natural father's consent: The contention that Francisco L. Dayrit's consent as the natural father was essential lacks basis. Article 3 of Rule 100 of the Rules of Court states that the consent of the natural father is not required if the child is illegitimate and unrecognized. Francisco L. Dayrit abandoned his daughter, forcing the natural mother to seek assistance from the petitioners to support their child. The petitioners provided for the child's upbringing, education, and schooling. During this period, the natural father did nothing to support or acknowledge the child. He only asserted his right to consent nearly a year after the adoption decree. Furthermore, Francisco L. Dayrit never legally recognized the child as required by Article 5 of Act No. 3753, which mandates signing and swearing to the birth certificate. His name on the birth certificate was considered not placed in accordance with the law. Therefore, the consent of a natural father who abandons his child and fails to recognize it according to law is not indispensable in an adoption proceeding.
Main Doctrine
The consent of the natural father is not required for the adoption of an illegitimate child if the father has abandoned the child and has not legally recognized it. Furthermore, a court loses jurisdiction to revoke a final and executory order after the lapse of the statutory period for its modification or appeal.