Carballo v. Encarnacion
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Mariano Ang filed a complaint against Antonio Carballo for the collection of P1,860.84 in the Municipal Court of Manila. Summons was served, and Carballo's counsel, Atty. J. Gonzales, entered a written appearance. The counsel filed motions for postponement due to illness, attaching a medical certificate. The court granted postponements but warned that if the counsel could not attend, Carballo should secure another lawyer. Procedural History: On the scheduled hearing date, neither Carballo nor his counsel appeared, despite a written manifestation from the counsel requesting further postponement due to continued illness. The plaintiff's counsel moved for Carballo to be declared in default, which the municipal court granted. Evidence was received ex-parte, and judgment was rendered against Carballo. Carballo's counsel was notified, filed a motion for new trial which was denied, and then perfected an appeal to the Court of First Instance (CFI). The Petition: In the CFI, the plaintiff argued that the decision was final and unappealable because it was rendered by default. The CFI agreed, holding that it only had jurisdiction to order the execution of the decision and returned the records to the municipal court. Carballo's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading him to file the present petition for certiorari, injunction, prohibition, and mandamus, seeking to nullify the CFI's order and compel a trial de novo.
Issue(s)
Whether a decision rendered ex-parte in the municipal court, after the defendant's counsel had entered an appearance and requested postponements due to illness, is a judgment by default and thus unappealable. Whether the Court of First Instance erred in declaring the municipal court's decision final and executory without proceeding with the trial de novo.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The respondent judge is directed to proceed with the trial of the case.
Ratio Decidendi
On the appealability of the municipal court's decision: The Supreme Court held that a decision by default rendered by an inferior court is not appealable. However, the Court clarified that the judgment in this case was not by default. While the defendant Carballo filed no answer, his counsel had entered a written appearance and filed motions for postponement. The Court cited Flores vs. Zurbito for the principle that an appearance, in whatever form, without expressly objecting to the court's jurisdiction over the person, constitutes submission to that jurisdiction. Therefore, Carballo had made an appearance. The Court further distinguished this from a default situation by referencing Quinzan vs. Arellano, stating that failure to appear at the trial, not failure to answer, is the sole ground for default in justice of the peace courts, a principle applicable to municipal courts. Since Carballo had appeared, he could not be declared in default merely for failing to file an answer. The subsequent hearing was ex-parte due to the absence of the defendant and his counsel on the trial date, but the judgment itself was not a default judgment in the strict sense that would render it unappealable. On the error of the Court of First Instance: Consequently, the Court found that the Court of First Instance erred in declaring the decision appealed from final and unappealable. Because the municipal court's judgment was not a default judgment, the defendant Carballo had a right to appeal. The CFI's conclusion that it only had jurisdiction to order execution was based on a misapprehension of the nature of the municipal court's judgment. The CFI should have proceeded with the trial of the case de novo, as is standard procedure for appeals from inferior courts. The petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus was therefore granted to correct this procedural error and ensure that Carballo's right to a trial on the merits was upheld.
Main Doctrine
A judgment rendered ex-parte after a party has made an appearance, even if without filing an answer, is not a judgment by default and is therefore appealable. Failure to appear at the trial, not failure to answer, is the sole ground for default in inferior courts.