Balinon v. De Leon
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Solicitor General filed a complaint against respondents Celestino M. de Leon and Justo T. Velayo, both members of the bar. It was alleged that since December 1948, respondent De Leon, who was still legally married to Vertudes Marquez, lived as husband and wife with Regina S. Balinon. Respondent De Leon prepared and subscribed an affidavit before respondent Velayo, a notary public, on February 4, 1948. This affidavit declared the existence of a separation contract between De Leon and his wife, the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, and his liberty to take Regina S. Balinon as his "lifetime partner" and "true and lawful wife." The affidavit further stated his commitment to uphold her honor, remain loyal, and acknowledge any offspring as legitimate. It also stipulated that future properties acquired during this relationship would belong to Regina S. Balinon, except for alimony and support, and that intentional desertion on his part could be grounds for perpetual disbarment. The complaint also alleged that respondent Velayo knowingly signed the affidavit despite its unlawful and immoral purposes, violating his oath of office. Procedural History: Not applicable as this is an administrative case before the Supreme Court. The Petition: The Solicitor General sought the suspension or disbarment of respondents De Leon and Velayo for their alleged violations of professional ethics and duties.
Issue(s)
Whether respondent Celestino M. de Leon's act of preparing and subscribing the affidavit constitutes a violation of his oath as an attorney and grounds for disbarment or suspension. Whether respondent Justo T. Velayo, as a notary public, is liable for notarizing the affidavit despite its alleged unlawful and immoral purposes.
Ruling
The Supreme Court suspended respondent Celestino M. de Leon from the practice of law for three years. Respondent Justo T. Velayo was reprimanded.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of respondent Celestino M. de Leon's liability: The Court held that respondent De Leon's act of preparing and subscribing the affidavit, which made it appear that he could take another woman as a lifetime partner and true and lawful wife during his subsisting marriage, virtually permitted him to commit the crime of concubinage. Although the consent of a spouse may bar criminal prosecution for concubinage, it does not legalize the act. The Court emphasized that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended for grounds other than those specifically enumerated in the rules, particularly if the acts demonstrate moral turpitude or are unbecoming of a lawyer. The Court noted that De Leon employed his knowledge of the law as an attorney to his advantage in preparing the affidavit. The contention that the affidavit was a mere unilateral declaration of facts was deemed irrelevant as it served to achieve his purpose of establishing a relationship with Regina S. Balinon with some degree of permanence. The Court cited the case of In re Roque Santiago where an attorney was suspended for preparing a similar document. On the issue of respondent Justo T. Velayo's liability: The Court found that respondent Velayo's participation was limited to notarizing the affidavit. While acknowledging that a notary public's duty is primarily to ascertain the identity of the affiant and the voluntariness of the declaration, the Court held that it is incumbent upon him to at least guard against having anything to do with an illegal or immoral arrangement. Velayo was found to be negligent in merely affixing his signature without knowing the contents, but his fault was mitigated by his reliance on the good faith of his co-respondent. Consequently, he was reprimanded instead of being suspended.
Main Doctrine
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for acts unrelated to his professional duties if such acts demonstrate moral turpitude or are otherwise unbecoming of a member of the bar. A notary public has a duty to guard against having anything to do with an illegal or immoral arrangement.