Picornell v. Cordova
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In Civil Case No. 51265, Jose M. Cordova was sentenced on March 4, 1939, to pay Hair and Picornell P12,715.41 plus interest. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on December 27, 1940, and a motion for reconsideration was denied on February 7, 1941, making the judgment final and executory. Partial execution resulted in an unpaid balance of P12,060.63. Procedural History: The interest of Hair and Picornell was assigned to S. W. Picornell and Co., which filed the present action (No. 10115) on January 16, 1950, to revive the judgment. The defendant, Jose M. Cordova, raised defenses of prescription and the applicability of Republic Act No. 342 (Moratorium Act), citing a claim filed with the Philippine War Damage Commission. The Court of First Instance disallowed both defenses and rendered judgment reviving the prewar judgment, with a proviso that enforcement be suspended until the expiration of the moratorium period. The case was certified to the Supreme Court on appeal. The Petition: The defendant-appellant appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance.
Issue(s)
Whether the action to revive the judgment had prescribed. Whether the action was maintainable in view of Republic Act No. 342.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance, except for the proviso suspending the execution of the judgment until eight years after the settlement of the appellant's war damage claim, which was annulled and set aside.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription: The Court held that the period of limitation for reviving a judgment does not begin to run until the judgment becomes final and executory. In this case, the judgment only became final after the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration on February 7, 1941. Since less than ten years elapsed from that date until the filing of the revival action on January 16, 1950, the action had not prescribed. The Court cited Article 1971 of the old Civil Code and Article 1152 of the new Civil Code, along with Section 43 of Act 190 and 31 Am. Jur. s. 846, to support this conclusion regarding the commencement of the prescriptive period. On the defense based on the Moratorium Act (Republic Act No. 342): The Court ruled that this defense could no longer be invoked. Citing its own decision in Rutter vs. Esteban (1953), the Court declared that the continued operation of Republic Act No. 342 had been declared unconstitutional. Therefore, any reliance on this Act as a defense against the revival of the judgment was invalid and could not bar the action. The proviso in the lower court's judgment suspending execution based on this Act was consequently annulled.
Main Doctrine
The period of limitation for the revival of a judgment begins to run only from the date the judgment becomes final and executory, and the Moratorium Act (Republic Act No. 342) can no longer be invoked as a defense after it has been declared unconstitutional.