Farrales v. Fuentecilla
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Epifanio Farrales initiated a forcible entry action concerning certain lands in barrio Paete, San Narciso, Zambales, against Quirino Dumlao and others. Farrales sought and obtained a preliminary mandatory injunction, placing him in possession of the disputed lands after due notice and hearing. 2. Procedural History: Following the issuance of the preliminary mandatory injunction on March 25, 1952, and subsequent hearings on the main case in May 1952, proceedings were discontinued. Approximately five months after the last hearing, the respondent Justice of the Peace issued an order on September 29, 1952, dissolving the preliminary injunction. This dissolution occurred without prior notice or hearing to the petitioner. 3. The Petition: Farrales filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, seeking to annul the order dissolving the preliminary injunction. He contended that the order was illegal, having been issued ex parte and constituting a grave abuse of discretion. The respondents argued that the dissolution was permissible under the Rules of Court, considering potential damage to the defendants and the availability of a counterbond to compensate the petitioner.
Issue(s)
Whether the order dissolving the preliminary mandatory injunction was illegal for having been issued ex parte. Whether the respondent Justice of the Peace committed grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The order dissolving the preliminary injunction is sustained.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the ex parte dissolution of the preliminary injunction: The Court held that Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court grants the court authority to dissolve a preliminary injunction if its continuance may cause great damage to the defendant, provided the latter posts a bond. While the rule is silent on the procedure, established jurisprudence indicates that a court may dissolve an injunction ex parte. The Court cited Ong Su Han v. Gutierrez David and Caluya v. Ramos, which held that dissolving an injunction already issued, even without previous notice and hearing, does not constitute acting without or in excess of jurisdiction. The failure to give notice or hold a hearing is merely an irregularity that does not go to the jurisdiction of the court. The Court further noted that in Clarke v. Phil. Ready Mix Concrete Co. Inc., this principle was summarized, and in Cine Ligaya v. the Court of First Instance of Laguna, it was reiterated that the failure to send notice or hold a hearing is not jurisdictional. The Court also referenced Jaranillo v. Jacinto et al. and So Chu et al. v. Nepomuceno, reinforcing that failure to give notice of subsequent steps in an action is not jurisdictional when the court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter. Therefore, the respondent Justice of the Peace acted substantially in accordance with the rules of court. On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion. The respondent Justice of the Peace stated that he dissolved the injunction after considering the great damage to the defendants and the fact that the petitioner could be fully compensated by the counterbond posted by the defendants. This reasoning, according to the Court, appeared to be substantiated by the record. The Court also addressed the petitioner's claim of other irregularities, stating that such matters should be brought before the Judge of the Court of First Instance or the Secretary of Justice, as the certiorari proceeding was not the proper venue for these allegations.
Main Doctrine
A court may dissolve a preliminary injunction ex parte, without prior notice and hearing to the adverse party, if it believes that its continuance may cause great damage to the defendant, provided the latter posts a sufficient bond. Such action, if taken in accordance with the rules, does not constitute grave abuse of discretion, lack of jurisdiction, or excess of jurisdiction.