Roque v. Delgado
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the closure of a cockpit, known as "Bagong Sabungan," located in barrio Calios, municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of Laguna. The closure was ordered by the Acting Executive Secretary on September 6, 1952, due to its proximity to a Seventh Day Adventist Church, violating Executive Order No. 318, series of 1941. 2. Procedural History: On November 21, 1952, Pablo Delgado and others filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Civil Case No. 9616) against the Acting Executive Secretary and other officials, seeking to restrain the closure. A preliminary injunction was issued on November 22, 1952. The petition was dismissed, and the injunction dissolved on March 6, 1953. Subsequently, on April 23, 1953, the original petitioners moved to restore the injunction pending appeal, which the court granted on June 1, 1953, suspending the dissolution of the injunction. A motion for reconsideration by the Acting Executive Secretary was denied on June 11, 1953. 3. The Petition: The Acting Executive Secretary, through the First Assistant Solicitor General, filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction in the Supreme Court on June 26, 1953, seeking to annul the order of June 1, 1953. The petitioner argued that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction because no appeal was pending when the injunction was restored, and the act sought to be enjoined had already occurred. The petition also contended the judge was inconsistent in his rulings. The Supreme Court considered the discretion vested in the trial court under Rule 39, section 4, and the judge's consideration of surrounding facts and circumstances, as well as the lack of substitution for the petitioner who had ceased to hold office.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess or lack of jurisdiction in restoring the writ of preliminary injunction when no appeal had yet been perfected. Whether the respondent Judge acted inconsistently in holding the cockpit's location to be in violation of Executive Order No. 318 and subsequently restoring the injunction. Whether the petitioner was properly notified of the hearing for the motion to restore the injunction. Whether the petition should be dismissed due to the petitioner having ceased to hold office without substitution.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The order of June 1, 1953, reinstating the writ of preliminary injunction, is upheld.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of restoring the injunction pending appeal: The Court held that the respondent Judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion. Rule 39, Section 4 of the Rules of Court grants the trial court discretion to suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the pendency of an appeal. While the provision speaks of an appeal being taken, the Court found no practical difference between the period when an appeal has been taken and the period during which an appeal may be perfected, as the judgment is not yet final in both instances. The Court cited authority to the effect that a trial court may restore a preliminary injunction in anticipation of an appeal. The respondent Judge's order considered "the facts and the circumstances surrounding the case," "the importance of the case," and "the tense situation of the contending parties," demonstrating a proper exercise of discretion. On the issue of inconsistency: The Court found no inconsistency. The respondent Judge, in restoring the injunction, was exercising the discretion vested in him by Section 4 of Rule 39. His order of June 1, 1953, took into account "new facts and circumstances registered on record" as stated in his denial of the motion for reconsideration. This indicates that his decision to restore the injunction was based on considerations that arose after his initial decision, rather than a contradiction of his earlier finding. On the issue of notice: The Court deemed the petitioner's claim of lack of notification to be of no moment. This is because the petitioner, through counsel, subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 1, 1953 order. This action effectively cured any defect in notice, as the petitioner had the opportunity to be heard and present their arguments. On the procedural issue of substitution: The Court noted that although the petitioner, Hon. Marciano Roque, had ceased to hold the office in virtue of which he instituted the petition, no substitution was made in accordance with Section 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This technicality also served as a reason for the dismissal of the petition.
Main Doctrine
The trial court may, in its discretion, restore a preliminary injunction during the pendency of an appeal, even if the appeal has not yet been perfected, provided it is in anticipation of an appeal and for the security of the rights of the adverse party. The court's discretion in such matters, when exercised considering the facts and circumstances, the importance of the case, and the tense situation of the parties, will not be deemed a grave abuse of discretion.