Faypon v. Quirino
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the eligibility of Eliseo Quirino for the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur. Perfecto Faypon, the petitioner, alleged that Quirino lacked the required residence in the province, a prerequisite for holding such office as stipulated in section 2071 of the Revised Administrative Code. Procedural History: Faypon initially filed a petition for quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, which was dismissed. This dismissal was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The present review before the Supreme Court stems from Faypon's petition for a writ of certiorari under Rule 46, challenging the Court of Appeals' judgment. The Petition: The petitioner seeks review of the Court of Appeals' decision, primarily arguing that the respondent, Eliseo Quirino, was ineligible to be elected Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur due to insufficient residence. Faypon contends that Quirino's registration as a voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947, coupled with his professional and business activities in Manila and other locations, constituted an abandonment of his original residence in Ilocos Sur. The petition also raised an issue regarding the irregular constitution of the division of the Court of Appeals that rendered the judgment, though this point was not ultimately pressed as a ground for reversal.
Issue(s)
Whether the alleged irregular designation of Associate Justices in the Court of Appeals renders its judgment void. Whether the respondent's registration as a voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947 constituted an abandonment or loss of his residence of origin in Ilocos Sur, thereby rendering him ineligible for the office of Provincial Governor.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petition for quo warranto. The respondent was deemed not to have lost his residence of origin in Ilocos Sur.
Ratio Decidendi
On the irregular constitution of the Court of Appeals division: The Court held that any alleged irregular designation of Associate Justices to form a division of five in the Court of Appeals does not affect its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Furthermore, even if such designation were irregular, remanding the case would unnecessarily delay the disposition to the detriment of public interest. The review by the Supreme Court itself sufficiently guarantees the petitioner's rights. The fact that no new hearing was held after the designation of additional justices does not render the judgment void, as the law allows consideration and adjudication by any member of the court at the time of consideration, regardless of their presence during submission. On the respondent's alleged lack of residence: The Court reiterated the established rule that mere absence from one's residence or domicile to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice one's avocation is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. The determination of legal residence or domicile largely depends on intention, which can be inferred from acts, activities, and utterances. The party claiming abandonment must prove it preponderantly. While registration as a voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947 implies residence there for the preceding six months and in the Philippines for one year, this act, in light of previous jurisprudence, does not automatically equate to abandonment of the residence of origin. The Court cited several cases (Yra vs. Abano, Vivero vs. Murillo, Laurena vs. Teves, Gallego vs. Verra) where registration as a voter in another locality did not result in the loss of residence of origin for election purposes. The Court emphasized the animus revertendi (intention to return) and the natural desire to return to one's birthplace, which must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment. The distinction between residence requirements for municipal and provincial offices was deemed a hair-splitting differentiation, with the principle that voter registration elsewhere does not automatically disqualify an official applying with equal force to both.
Main Doctrine
Registration as a voter in a place other than one's residence of origin, for purposes of elections, does not automatically constitute abandonment or loss of such residence of origin, especially when the individual maintains an animus revertendi and has not demonstrated a clear intention to establish a new domicile.