Brillo v. Enage
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the tenure of Eugenio N. Brillo, who served as the Justice of the Peace for Tacloban, Leyte, since 1921. The Republic Act No. 760, enacted on June 20, 1952, converted the municipality of Tacloban into a city, effective June 12, 1953. This Act established a municipal court for the city with a municipal judge whose jurisdiction would be the same as that conferred upon a Justice of the Peace. 2. Procedural History: Following the inauguration of Tacloban City on June 12, 1953, a municipal judge was appointed, and the respondent, Manuel Enage, was subsequently appointed as the ad interim Municipal Judge of Tacloban City on June 27, 1953, taking his oath on July 6, 1953. Brillo had previously sought to retain his position by petitioning the Secretary of Justice on November 15, 1952, and later appealing to the President on October 7, 1953, both without success. 3. The Petition: Brillo filed this petition for review, arguing that his position as Justice of the Peace was not abolished by the city charter and that he was unlawfully removed. He contended that the municipal judge position in the newly created city was a continuation of his former role. The petition challenges the legality of Enage's appointment and seeks Brillo's reinstatement. The Supreme Court considered whether the petition was filed out of time and whether the city charter effectively abolished Brillo's office, ultimately finding that the office was not abolished but merely renamed, and thus Brillo had the right to continue in the position.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition was filed out of time. Whether the office of the municipal judge of Tacloban was abolished by the enactment of Republic Act No. 760, converting the municipality into a city. Whether the respondent's appointment as City Judge was legal.
Ruling
The petition was filed on time. The office of the municipal judge was not abolished by the conversion of Tacloban into a city. The respondent's appointment was without legal authority, and he is a usurper of the office. The petition is granted, and the respondent is ordered to vacate the office and surrender it to the petitioner. The case against the Secretary of Justice is dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of timeliness: The Court held that the petition was not filed out of time. The respondent's contention that the one-year period should be counted from the effectivity of Republic Act No. 761 on June 20, 1952, was rejected. The Court reasoned that the petitioner's right of action did not arise until the inauguration of the city on June 12, 1953, as he continued to discharge his duties as Justice of the Peace without any obstacle until the day prior to the inauguration. Therefore, the action was timely filed within the prescribed period after the cause of action accrued, citing Bautista vs. Fajardo and Abeto vs. Rodas. On the abolition of the office: The Court ruled that the office of the municipal judge was not abolished by the conversion of Tacloban into a city. While the form of local government changed, the office itself, with substantially the same duties, continued to exist under a new name, that of City Judge. The Court cited numerous authorities, including Perrey vs. Bianchi and State vs. White, for the principle that a change in the form of local government does not vacate an office if its duties remain substantially the same and there is no provision declaring the office vacant. The Court emphasized that the statute did not abolish the office in good faith but merely changed its designation. On the legality of the respondent's appointment: Given that the office was not abolished and the petitioner had the right to continue therein, the Court concluded that the respondent's appointment as City Judge was without legal authority. The respondent was therefore considered a usurper of the office. The Court stated that the petitioner, as the rightful incumbent, had the right to continue performing his duties in the office, now titled City Judge, and ordered the respondent to vacate and surrender the position to the petitioner.
Main Doctrine
The change in the form of local government from a municipality to a city does not automatically abolish the office of the municipal judge; the office is merely renamed to city judge, and the incumbent judge has the right to continue in the position.