Chua Lamko v. Dioso
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In March 1939, Chua Lamko obtained a judgment foreclosing a mortgage debt of P1,910.10. The mortgaged property was sold at public auction to Chua Lamko as the highest bidder, but judicial confirmation of the sale was never obtained. Chua Lamko took possession and subsequently sold the property to various defendants in 1946, 1948, and 1949. Procedural History: On February 22, 1950, the plaintiffs instituted an action to recover the mortgaged property, alleging ownership and the nullity of the sale to Chua Lamko and subsequent conveyances. Chua Lamko, as a third-party defendant, filed a counterclaim for the judgment he had obtained in the foreclosure case, amounting to P3,918.96. The Court of First Instance declared the plaintiffs as owners, reversed the defendants' rights against Chua Lamko, and dismissed Chua Lamko's counterclaim on the ground of prescription, stating the judgment was entered in March 1939 and asserted in March 1950, more than ten years later. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. The Petition: Chua Lamko petitioned for review, not assailing the award of ownership to the plaintiffs, but insisting on his counterclaim. He argued that the counterclaim had not prescribed due to the Moratorium Law and that prescription could not be considered as it was not alleged by the plaintiffs in their answer to his counterclaim.
Issue(s)
Whether Chua Lamko's counterclaim based on the 1939 judgment had prescribed. Whether the defense of prescription was waived by the plaintiffs for failure to raise it in their answer to the counterclaim. Whether the Moratorium Law suspended the running of the Statute of Limitations on Chua Lamko's counterclaim.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, dismissing Chua Lamko's counterclaim on the ground of prescription. The Court held that the defense of prescription was not waived as it did not raise an issue of fact, and that Chua Lamko's claim regarding the Moratorium Law was unmeritorious and not timely raised.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether Chua Lamko's counterclaim based on the 1939 judgment had prescribed: The Court found that the judgment was entered in March 1939 and the counterclaim was asserted in March 1950, more than ten years later. This period exceeded the ten-year prescriptive period for enforcing judgments under Rule 39, Section 6, and Section 43 of Act 190. Therefore, the action to enforce the judgment had been barred by the statute of limitations. On whether the defense of prescription was waived by the plaintiffs for failure to raise it in their answer to the counterclaim: The Court clarified that waiver of the defense of prescription under Rule 9, Sections 9 and 10, applies only to defenses of prescription "that would raise issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading." In this case, the dates of the judgment (March 1939) and the assertion of the counterclaim (March 1950) were not denied, meaning no issue of fact was involved. Thus, the plaintiffs were not required to specifically plead prescription, and their failure to do so did not constitute a waiver. On whether the Moratorium Law suspended the running of the Statute of Limitations on Chua Lamko's counterclaim: The Court noted that this issue was not raised in Chua Lamko's brief to the Court of Appeals, precluding him from raising it before the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Court found the plea unmeritorious, believing that Chua Lamko would not have filed an action to enforce the 1939 judgment even without the Moratorium Laws, as he was satisfied with the foreclosure sale and had sold the property for more than the judgment amount, indicating he believed his judgment had been paid. His mistaken belief that he had been paid did not stop the course of the statute of limitations.
Main Doctrine
The defense of prescription, when based on facts appearing on the face of the pleading, does not require specific pleading and is not deemed waived by failure to raise it in the answer, as it does not raise an issue of fact.