Chung Ben v. Co Bun Kim
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: A complaint for detainer was filed by Chung Ben against Co Bun Kim and Lydia Tiao Han. The municipal court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendants to vacate the premises, pay P2,700 as rentals in arrears with interest, future rentals at P300 per month until vacation, P200 for attorney's fees, and costs. Procedural History: The defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila. The plaintiff moved for immediate execution of the judgment, citing the defendants' failure to pay or deposit the July rental in advance within the first five days of the month, as stipulated in their lease contract. The Court of First Instance granted the motion for immediate execution. The defendants then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with preliminary injunction in the Court of Appeals to annul the order of immediate execution. The Court of Appeals annulled the order, holding that the July rent was due on or before the 10th of the succeeding month. The Petition: Chung Ben seeks the review and reversal of the Court of Appeals' judgment, contending that the respondents' failure to pay the July rental by the 5th of the month, as agreed in the lease contract, entitled him to immediate execution.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondents were required to deposit the July rental on or before July 5 per the lease contract, or on or before August 10 per the general provision of Section 8, Rule 72, to stay the execution of the judgment pending appeal.
Ruling
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals is dissolved.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the statutory grace period because the record established the existence of a lease contract. Under Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, an appellant must pay the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment. The Court emphasized that the provision allowing for payment by the tenth day of the following month is explicitly conditional, applying only 'in the absence of a contract.' In this case, although the dispositive part of the Municipal Court judgment was silent on the contract's specific terms, the respondents did not deny the petitioner's allegation that a contract existed requiring payment in advance within the first five days of the month. Relying on the precedent in Peck v. Concepcion (74 Phil. 653), the Court ruled that when a contract for advance payment exists, the defendant's failure to pay or deposit the rent within that contractual period entitles the plaintiff to immediate execution. The CFI, therefore, had no alternative but to grant the execution because the respondents failed to comply with the specific timing required by their agreement. Consequently, the July rental was indeed due on July 5, 1953, and the deposit made thereafter did not satisfy the requirements to stay execution.
Main Doctrine
In unlawful detainer cases appealed to the Court of First Instance, if a lease contract exists and the judgment of the municipal court finds rent due under that contract, the defendant must pay or deposit the rent due from time to time under the contract during the pendency of the appeal, as provided in Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. The provision allowing payment or deposit on or before the tenth day of the succeeding month applies only in the absence of a contract or when the rent is based on the reasonable value of use and occupation.