People v. Rosario
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An information was filed on July 27, 1953, charging Paz M. del Rosario with slight physical injuries committed on May 28, 1953. Procedural History: The accused filed a motion to quash the information, arguing that the offense had prescribed based on Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. The Petition: The People of the Philippines appealed the dismissal order directly to the Supreme Court, contending that the offense had not yet prescribed.
Issue(s)
Whether the first day of the prescriptive period should be excluded or included in the computation. Whether the term 'month' in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code refers to a 30-day month or a calendar month.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal and ordered the case reinstated. The Court held that the offense had not prescribed when the information was filed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that in the computation of a period of time within which an act is to be done, the law in this jurisdiction has always directed that the first day be excluded and the last included. While Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) specifies when the period commences, it is deficient in explicitly defining the method of counting. Applying Article 18 of the Civil Code, which directs that deficiencies in special laws must be supplied by the Civil Code's provisions, the Court looked to Article 13 of the Civil Code. This article explicitly states that in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included. This method is consistent with Section 1, Rule 28 of the Rules of Court and Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC). The Court cited Surbano vs. Gloria to demonstrate that this rule has been consistently applied since the Spanish Civil Code was in force. Therefore, May 28, 1953, must be excluded from the 60-day count. On Issue 2: The Court ruled that the term 'month' in Article 90 of the RPC must be understood as a 30-day month. Although the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) had previously defined 'month' as a civil or calendar month, the enactment of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 386) changed the rule. Article 13 of the new Civil Code reverted to the 30-day month standard. Since the RPC does not define 'month,' the general application of the Civil Code's definitions must prevail for offenses committed after the Civil Code took effect. The Court also found persuasive authority in Spanish jurisprudence, which held that under the Spanish Civil Code (the source of the Philippine provision), a two-month prescriptive period for light offenses means 60 days. Consequently, July 27, 1953, was the 60th day from May 29, 1953, meaning the offense had not yet prescribed when the information was filed.
Main Doctrine
The term 'month' in the Revised Penal Code, in the absence of a contrary definition therein, should be interpreted as a 30-day month, consistent with Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The period of prescription commences to run from the day following the commission of the offense, excluding the first day and including the last day.