People v. Hernandez
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An information for qualified theft was filed against Anselmo Reyes as principal and Amada Reyes de Hernandez, Ricardo Reyes, Teofilo Reyes, Solano Hernandez, and others as accessories after the fact. The principal accused, Anselmo Reyes, pleaded guilty to simple theft. The accused charged as accessories pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to quash, invoking Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code due to their familial relationship with the principal accused, asserting exemption from criminal responsibility. Procedural History: The prosecution moved to amend the information to allege that the accused profited from the crime. The defense objected, arguing it was a material change not allowable after plea. The Court denied the amendment, stating it would substantially affect the accused's rights, and then dismissed the case against the alleged accessories upon the prosecution's motion, with a reservation to file another information. A new information was filed, alleging that the accused received the jewelry with intent of gain and profited from it. The accused moved to quash this second information, alleging double jeopardy, which the lower court granted. The Petition: The prosecution appealed the order of dismissal, arguing that double jeopardy did not attach because the accused could not have been convicted under the first information due to their relationship, and the second information required proof of intent of gain, which was not covered by the first.
Issue(s)
Whether the dismissal of the first information (Case No. Q-972) upon the motion of the prosecution, following the accused's motion to quash, constitutes a bar to a second prosecution (Case No. Q-1064) under the principle of double jeopardy.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal and ordered the case remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. The plea of double jeopardy was erroneously sustained.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court ruled that double jeopardy did not attach for several reasons. First, the case was not terminated without the express consent of the accused; by filing a motion to quash on the ground that the facts did not constitute a crime, and by the trial court virtually sustaining that position when it denied the fiscal's motion to amend, the resulting dismissal was effectively induced by the accused. Second, under Rule 113, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, jeopardy only attaches if the information is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; here, the appellees themselves proved that the first information was insufficient to charge them as accessories because it lacked the allegation of 'intent of gain' necessary to overcome the exemption in Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Third, the Court applied the principle of estoppel established in People v. Acierto (92 Phil. 534), stating that an accused cannot be allowed to make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent positions. Having successfully contended that the first information was insufficient to sustain a conviction, they are now barred from claiming it was sufficient enough to place them in legal jeopardy. The Court emphasized that it is contrary to elementary principles of good faith for an accused to tell one court it lacks the authority to convict him and then tell a subsequent court that the first court’s action bars further trial.
Main Doctrine
An accused who successfully contends that an information is insufficient to sustain a conviction due to their relationship with the principal accused, thereby leading to the dismissal of the case, is estopped from later claiming that the same information placed them in double jeopardy.