People v. Kho
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Felix Kho, alias Co Cam, Sun Leo, Choa Eng Kuan, and Amado M. Apostol were charged in Criminal Case No. 4253 with allowing or procuring the removal of cigarettes subject to specific tax without paying the tax, due to the use of fake stamps. In this case, Felix Kho, Sun Leo, and Amado M. Apostol were acquitted on the ground that the factory manager, Choa Eng Kuan, had exclusive control and that there was no evidence of conspiracy or knowledge on the part of the acquitted individuals. Procedural History: Subsequently, in Criminal Case No. 4264, the same individuals were charged with possession of false and counterfeit internal revenue stamps intended to evade specific taxes. Felix Kho, Sun Leo, and Amado M. Apostol filed a motion to quash, arguing that the previous acquittal in Criminal Case No. 4253, where it was established that Choa Eng Kuan had sole control, barred the present prosecution. The lower court granted the motion to quash, ruling that the acquittal in the first case constituted double jeopardy. The prosecution appealed this order. The Appeal: The prosecution appealed the order of dismissal, contending that the lower court erred in ruling that the acquittal in Criminal Case No. 4253 was a bar to the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 4264. The prosecution argued that the offenses charged in the two cases were distinct and that the appellees had not presented evidence in the second case to prove their lack of participation or knowledge, unlike in the first case where their acquittal was based on a lack of evidence against them.
Issue(s)
Whether the acquittal of Felix Kho, Sun Leo, and Amado M. Apostol in Criminal Case No. 4253, for allowing or procuring the removal of cigarettes subject to specific tax without payment thereof due to the use of fake stamps, bars their prosecution in Criminal Case No. 4264 for possession of false and counterfeit internal revenue stamps for the purpose of evading specific taxes, on the ground of double jeopardy. Whether the filing of an amended information and the subsequent motion to quash by the appellees would place them in jeopardy for a second time.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed order, remanding the case to the Court of First Instance of Rizal for further proceedings. The Court held that the acquittal in the first case did not bar the prosecution in the second case as the offenses were distinct. The Court also found the appellees' argument regarding double jeopardy due to the amended information to be untenable.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the plea of previous conviction or acquittal will only prosper if the former prosecution is for the same offense, or for an attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information, as provided by Section 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The Court found that the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4253, namely, allowing or procuring the removal of cigarettes subject to specific tax without paying said tax under Section 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code, is distinct and different from the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4264, which is the possession of counterfeit internal revenue stamps for the purpose of using them to evade the payment of specific taxes under Section 170 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Therefore, the acquittal in the first case did not constitute double jeopardy for the second case. The Court also noted that while the appellees argued that the factory manager was solely responsible, this would be a matter of defense requiring proof, and it could not be assumed that they lacked knowledge or participation in the possession of counterfeit stamps without presenting evidence, unlike in the first case where their acquittal was based on a lack of evidence against them. On Issue 2: The Court found the appellees' contention that the appeal taken by the prosecution would place them in jeopardy for a second time to be clearly untenable. This is because an amended information was filed by the fiscal, and there was nothing in the record to show that the appellees had already been arraigned under this amended information. It was precisely this amended information that the appellees moved to quash. Therefore, the procedural step of filing an amended information and moving to quash it before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy.
Main Doctrine
A plea of previous acquittal or conviction under the Rules of Court requires that the former prosecution be for the same offense, or for an attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. If the offenses are distinct and different, an acquittal in one case does not bar prosecution in the other, even if they arise from the same transaction or involve the same parties.