People v. Cadabis

G.R. No. L-7713 · 1955-10-31 · J. BENGZON, J.: · Primary: Criminal Law; Secondary: Election Law
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Esteban Cadabis, a policeman, was charged with violation of the election law for allegedly carrying a carbine within a polling place and within a radius of thirty meters thereof on November 10, 1953, the day of voting and canvassing in relation to the general elections of 1953. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur quashed the information upon motion of the defendant. The trial judge held that the information did not allege that the accused was not authorized to carry a firearm or that he did not carry it during an affray, tumult, or disorder. The defendant presented a document purportedly signed by the board of inspectors requesting his presence to maintain order, which the court considered despite the fiscal's objection. The Petition: The People of the Philippines appealed, contending that the court erred in holding that the facts charged did not constitute an offense and in prematurely finding that the accused was authorized to remain in the polling place.

Issue(s)

Whether the information sufficiently charged a violation of the election law. Whether the court erred in considering a document presented by the accused during the hearing of the motion to quash.

Ruling

The order dismissing the information is reversed, and the record is remanded to the court below for further proceedings. Costs against the appellee.

Ratio Decidendi

On the sufficiency of the information: The Court held that the information sufficiently charged a violation of Section 53 of the Revised Election Code, which prohibits carrying deadly weapons in polling places. The exception for peace officers authorized to carry firearms for preserving order or enforcing laws is a matter of defense that the accused must assert and establish, not a fact the prosecution must negate in the information. The prosecution is not required to allege that the accused falls within the saving clause of the statute; this is a defense the accused must prove, similar to cases involving the Opium Law where the burden of proving a prescription rests on the accused. On the premature consideration of the document: The Court found it irregular and improper for the trial court to have considered the document presented by the accused during the motion to quash hearing over the fiscal's objection. The general principle is that in the hearing of a motion to quash, only facts alleged in the information and those admitted by the fiscal should be considered, unless the Rules expressly permit the investigation of facts. Matters of defense, such as authorization to carry a weapon, cannot be produced during such hearings, except for specific grounds like extinction of criminal liability, prescription, or former jeopardy. The document presented by the accused did not fall under any of these exceptions, and its genuineness and time of execution were questioned by the prosecution.

Main Doctrine

In a prosecution for violation of a statute containing an excepting clause, the information need not allege that the accused falls within the exception; this is a matter of defense which the accused must prove. Furthermore, matters of defense cannot generally be produced during the hearing of a motion to quash, except where the Rules expressly permit.

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