Hilvano v. Fernandez
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Eduardo Hilvano was accused of malversation of public funds. He initially pleaded not guilty but later petitioned to withdraw his plea and substitute it with a plea of guilty. The court granted this petition and rendered judgment sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty, disqualification, a fine, and to indemnify the government. Procedural History: Petitioner requested to serve his sentence in Muntinlupa prison, waiving the reading of the sentence in Samar. The sentence was read to him in Muntinlupa, and he commenced serving it on April 3, 1954. He later filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment, arguing the penalty was excessive, which was denied. Subsequently, he filed a notice of appeal and a motion for reduction of bail. The trial court refused to give due course to his appeal and denied his motion for bail reduction. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Judge to allow his appeal and to fix his appeal bond at P10,000.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in disallowing the appeal filed after the petitioner commenced serving sentence. Whether the judgment against the petitioner had become final and non-appealable on April 3, 1954.
Ruling
The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in disallowing the appeal because the judgment had already become final and executory when the petitioner commenced serving his sentence.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the trial court erred in disallowing the appeal filed after the petitioner commenced serving sentence: The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not err in disallowing the appeal. The Court emphasized that a judgment becomes final and executory when the accused commences to serve the sentence imposed upon him. In this case, the petitioner admitted to commencing service of his sentence on April 3, 1954. Therefore, by April 3, 1954, the judgment had become final and non-appealable. The subsequent filing of an appeal was thus made after the trial court had already lost jurisdiction over the case. The Court cited Rule 116, Section 7, and several previous cases, including Gregorio vs. Director of Prisons, People vs. Quebral, and People vs. Feliciano, to support this principle. On the issue of whether the judgment against the petitioner had become final and non-appealable on April 3, 1954: The Supreme Court affirmed that the judgment had indeed become final and non-appealable on April 3, 1954. The petitioner's contention that his commitment to prison was not for the purpose of commencing service of sentence but due to his inability to procure bond was found to be without merit. The Court pointed to the petitioner's own admission in his petition that he was committed to serve the sentence. Furthermore, evidence showed that the petitioner had requested the Secretary of Justice to ask the trial court to authorize the Director of Prisons to read the sentence to him in Muntinlupa, indicating his desire to serve the sentence without appearing in the Samar court for promulgation. This expressed desire to serve the sentence necessarily implied a willingness to abide by the penalty imposed, thus rendering the judgment final and executory on the date he commenced serving it.
Main Doctrine
A judgment becomes final and executory when the accused commences to serve sentence, even if an appeal is subsequently filed, as the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon finality of the judgment.