Mallare v. Panahon
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Amando Mallare and Susana Pangilinan filed a civil case against Flora Panahon, et al., seeking payment of a loan of 260 cavanes of palay, due on February 29, 1940, and the foreclosure of a mortgage on a parcel of registered land in Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, in case of non-payment. 2. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered a judgment ordering the defendants to pay the debt in palay or, if not paid within 90 days, to sell the mortgaged property to pay the debt. The court also applied the Moratorium Law, suspending execution for six years after war damage claims were paid or until Executive Order No. 32 was lifted. On July 20, 1953, the plaintiffs sought execution, citing a Supreme Court decision declaring the Moratorium Law unconstitutional. The lower court ordered execution on July 28, 1953, leading to the sheriff's sale of the land to the plaintiffs on October 20, 1953, and confirmation of the sale on November 21, 1953. Defendants filed two motions for reconsideration, both denied, and subsequently appealed. 3. The Petition: The appellants seek to appeal the order confirming the foreclosure sale. The appellees moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing it was not perfected on time. The Supreme Court, after ordering the elevation of original records, found that the appellants received notice of the confirmation order on November 28, 1953. They filed their first motion for reconsideration on December 1, 1953, and a second on January 23, 1954. The lower court denied the second motion on January 26, 1954, and appellants were notified on February 2, 1954, on which day they filed their notice of appeal. The Court determined that the appeal bond was filed significantly late, rendering the appeal not perfected within the statutory period, and thus dismissed the appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the appeal was perfected on time. Whether the second motion for reconsideration interrupted the period for appeal.
Ruling
The appeal is dismissed and the order appealed from is declared final. Costs are against the appellants.
Ratio Decidendi
On the timeliness of the appeal: The Court found that the appellants received notice of the order confirming the foreclosure sale on November 28, 1953. Their thirty-day period for appeal commenced on November 29, 1953. They filed their first motion for reconsideration on December 1, 1953, and a supplementary pleading on December 7, 1953, followed by another motion on December 9, 1953. These motions were denied on January 7, 1954, and notice of denial was received on January 13, 1954. A second motion for reconsideration was filed on January 23, 1954, and denied on January 26, 1954, with notice on February 2, 1954. The appellants filed their notice of appeal on February 2, 1954. Assuming the second motion for reconsideration suspended the appeal period, 11 days had elapsed, leaving 19 days. However, the record on appeal was filed on February 6, 1954, within the statutory period, but the cash appeal bond was paid only on March 13, 1954, which was 20 days late. The Court reiterated the well-settled rule that failure to file the appeal bond on time is fatal to the appeal, citing Rural Progress Administration vs. Temporosa and Salva vs. Judge Palacio, et al. On the effect of the second motion for reconsideration: The Court further held that the second motion for reconsideration did not interrupt the 30-day period for appealing. This is because the new ground alleged therein, that the debt was payable in palay and the proceeds of the sale should be used to purchase palay, already existed, was available, and could have been alleged when their first motion to reconsider was filed, pursuant to Rule 37, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, the appeal period actually expired 19 days after January 23, 1954, which was February 11, 1954, making the appeal bond filed 31 days too late.
Main Doctrine
Failure to file the appeal bond on time is fatal to the appeal, even if the notice of appeal and record on appeal were filed on time. A second motion for reconsideration does not interrupt the period for appeal if the new ground alleged therein already existed and could have been alleged in the first motion.