Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company Employees' Union v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company Free Telephone Workers' Union
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) received notice from the Free Telephone Workers' Union (PAPLU) of its intent to bargain collectively. The Company, previously believing the PLDT Employees Union to be the sole legitimate labor organization with which it had an existing collective bargaining agreement, was uncertain which union represented the majority of its employees. Consequently, PLDT filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) seeking a certification to determine the proper collective bargaining agency and, if necessary, to order a certification election. Procedural History: The PLDT Employees Union intervened in the CIR proceedings, filing a motion to dismiss the company's petition. They argued that their existing collective bargaining agreement, valid until September 14, 1954, would be impaired by allowing another union to demand bargaining. The Free Telephone Workers' Union asserted it represented the majority and contended that the existing agreement was not a bar to determining the majority representation, especially since no certification election had occurred within the preceding twelve months. Initially, the CIR dismissed the petition, citing the existing agreement's expiration date. However, upon reconsideration, the CIR en banc set aside the dismissal and remanded the case for a determination of the appropriate bargaining unit and a subsequent certification election if needed. The Petition: The PLDT Employees Union filed this petition for review, which serves as an appeal, challenging the CIR's order to remand the case. The Union argues that the CIR's order is interlocutory and therefore not appealable, as it does not finally dispose of the case. Furthermore, the Union contends that the CIR's order impairs its existing collective bargaining agreement. The Court, however, notes that the order contemplates that any new bargaining agreement would only take effect after the expiration of the current one and references US labor law and jurisprudence regarding contract bars to certification elections, suggesting that the existing contract, in operation for over two years, would not necessarily bar an election, especially given the statutory provision against ordering elections more often than once a year.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition for review of the CIR's order remanding the case for determination of the bargaining agency and certification election is premature. Whether the existing collective bargaining agreement between the PLDT Employees Union and the company constitutes a bar to a certification election. Whether the CIR's order impairs the constitutional provision against impairment of contracts.
Ruling
The petition for review is denied. The case is remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations for a speedy and appropriate hearing to determine the labor union representing the majority of the employees, after which a certification election may be ordered.
Ratio Decidendi
On the prematurity of the appeal: The Court held that the petition for review was premature. It reiterated the general rule that only final judgments or orders are appealable, and an interlocutory order, which does not finally dispose of the pending action, is not appealable. The order of the CIR remanding the case for further proceedings, specifically to determine the proper bargaining agency and to order a certification election if necessary, left something to be done in the trial court. Therefore, it was interlocutory and not subject to immediate appeal. The Court noted that if the intervenor's union was not declared the proper bargaining agency, an appeal at that stage would have been useless, and it was not yet aggrieved by the order. On the collective bargaining agreement as a bar to a certification election: The Court found the assertion that the appealed order impairs the petitioner's CBA to be unfounded. It clarified that the order contemplated that any new bargaining agreement would take effect only after the expiration of the existing CBA on September 14, 1954. The Court also discussed the American labor law perspective, citing that a collective bargaining contract is a bar to a certification election only if it has a definite and reasonable period to run and has not been in existence for too long. It noted that contracts exceeding two years are often not considered an obstacle. The Court pointed out that the contract in question, signed on December 1, 1951, had been in operation for over two years by August 1954, making it no bar to a certification election even under American labor views. Furthermore, the statute limiting certification elections to once a year might suggest that a CBA could be terminated after a year by a new majority organization. On the impairment of contract: The Court dismissed the claim of impairment of contract. It reasoned that the CIR's order did not impair the contract but rather contemplated that any new agreement would only take effect after the expiration of the existing one. The Court also invoked the modern concept embodied in the New Civil Code that labor contracts, being impressed with common interest, are subject to special laws on labor unions and collective bargaining (Art. 1700). This implies that such contracts are not absolute and can be regulated or affected by subsequent legislation or administrative actions aimed at promoting industrial peace and employee representation.
Main Doctrine
An interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss is not appealable as it does not finally dispose of the case. Furthermore, a collective bargaining agreement, even with an automatic renewal clause, may not serve as a bar to a certification election if a contesting union has given timely notice or filed a petition reasonably prior to the specified date for automatic renewal, especially when the existing contract has been in existence for a significant period, considering the modern concept that labor contracts are impressed with common interest and subject to special laws.