Ochoa v. Mayor and Treasurer of Pasay City
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Petitioners, admitted bona fide pork vendors and stall holders in the Pasay City public market, were required to pay a slaughter fee of P0.05 per kilo for their swine. This fee was prescribed by Ordinance No. 3, series of 1945, for the slaughtering of "large cattle" in the Pasay City public abattoir. The petitioners contended that the term "large cattle" in the ordinance did not encompass swine or hogs. 2. Procedural History: The petitioners initiated a case in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking a declaratory judgment that the application of Ordinance No. 3 to swine was erroneous and illegal. The respondents, the Mayor and Treasurer of Pasay City, raised only the legal question of whether hogs were included in "large cattle." The lower court, resolving this question in the negative, declared the ordinance inapplicable to swine slaughtered hereafter by the petitioners. 3. The Petition: The petitioners appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that the lower court erred in limiting the effect of its ruling to swine slaughtered only "hereafter." They asserted that if the ordinance's term "large cattle" does not include swine, then the enactment should be inapplicable to all swine slaughtered at any time after the ordinance's passage, not just future slaughterings. The Supreme Court modified the decision to reflect this broader applicability.
Issue(s)
Whether the term "large cattle" as used in Section 1 of Ordinance No. 3, series of 1945 of Pasay City, includes swine or hogs. Whether the lower court erred in limiting the effect of its declaration of inapplicability to swine or hogs slaughtered hereafter.
Ruling
The Supreme Court modified the decision of the lower court. It ruled that swine or hogs slaughtered in the public abattoir of Pasay City, at any time after the passage of Ordinance No. 3, series of 1945, are not subject to the provisions thereof. The decision was affirmed in all other respects.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's finding that the term "large cattle" as used in Section 1 of Ordinance No. 3, series of 1945, does not include swine or hogs. The Court adhered to the principle of statutory construction that the plain and ordinary meaning of words must be given effect. If the legislative body intended to include swine within the scope of "large cattle," it should have explicitly stated so. The absence of such explicit inclusion means that the ordinance, as written, applies only to what is commonly understood as large cattle, and not to swine. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court found the lower court's limitation of the ordinance's inapplicability to swine or hogs slaughtered hereafter to be untenable. The Court reasoned that if, as correctly held by the lower court, the term "large cattle" in the ordinance does not encompass swine or hogs, then the ordinance is inherently inapplicable to any and all swine slaughtered in the public abattoir during the ordinance's effectivity. This inapplicability is not contingent on the timing of the slaughter relative to the court's decision but on the substantive interpretation of the ordinance's terms. Therefore, the declaration of inapplicability should extend to all past and future slaughter of swine under the said ordinance.
Main Doctrine
The term 'large cattle' as used in Section 1 of Ordinance No. 3, series of 1945 of Pasay City, does not include swine or hogs. Consequently, the ordinance imposing slaughter fees for 'large cattle' is inapplicable to swine or hogs slaughtered in the public abattoir of Pasay City.