People v. Aragon
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The accused contracted a first marriage on September 28, 1925. While this marriage was subsisting, he contracted a second marriage on August 27, 1934. His first wife died on August 5, 1939. After the death of his first wife, and while his second marriage was still subsisting, the accused contracted a third marriage on October 3, 1953. The accused admitted the third marriage but initially denied the second marriage, though this was later established. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Cebu found the appellant guilty of bigamy. The trial court ruled that even without an express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, the defendant could not legally contract a subsequent marriage without the dissolution of his prior marriage, either by death or by judicial declaration of nullity. The Petition: The defendant appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance, relying on the case of People vs. Mendoza.
Issue(s)
Whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio was necessary under the law then in force before the accused could validly contract a third marriage.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of First Instance and acquitted the defendant-appellant. The Court held that the subsequent marriage contracted by the accused with Jesusa C. Maglasang was valid because it was entered into after the death of his first wife and before any judicial declaration of nullity of his second marriage. The Court further clarified that in the absence of an express provision in the law requiring a judicial declaration of nullity for void ab initio marriages to be a prerequisite for prosecution for bigamy, and adhering to the principle of strict construction of penal laws, the accused could not be prosecuted for contracting the third marriage under these circumstances.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the conviction for bigamy cannot stand because the third marriage was valid. Under Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613), a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of a first spouse is illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. The Court emphasized the fundamental principle of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, noting that the Revised Penal Code did not contain an express provision requiring a judicial declaration of nullity for marriages void ab initio. Although the second marriage to Maria Faicol was bigamous, it was a nullity from the start; therefore, it did not constitute a 'former marriage' within the meaning of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Once the first wife, Maria Gorrea, died in 1939, the only valid marriage Aragon ever had was dissolved by death. Consequently, when he married Jesusa Maglasang in 1953, he was no longer bound by a valid subsisting marriage, as the Faicol marriage remained void regardless of the lack of a judicial decree. Thus, the third marriage was valid and did not meet the elements of bigamy.
Main Doctrine
A subsequent marriage contracted before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, either by death or by judicial declaration of nullity, is illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. However, the penal statute for bigamy requires strict interpretation, and in the absence of an express provision mandating a judicial declaration of nullity for void ab initio marriages to be a prerequisite for prosecution, such a declaration is not required for the prosecution of bigamy.